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Winter is Here: The Impossibility of
Schrems II for U.S.-Based Direct-toConsumer Companies
Vanessa Zimmer*
Abstract
In this paper, Vanessa Zimmer exposes the precarious position of Direct-toConsumer (DTC) companies that are physically located in the United States but
still subject to the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) under
Article 3(2) because they offer goods or services to European consumers online.
Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) and supplementary measures have
dominated privacy conversions in the year since the European Court of Justice
invalidated the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield framework with its Schrems II decision.
However, Zimmer argues that the greater issue for U.S.-based DTC companies is
the lack of clarity over what constitutes an international, or restricted, transfer
under the GDPR in the first place. Is an international transfer any physical
transfer of personal data from within the European Economic Area to outside its
borders (the so-called “geographic” definition of international transfer)
regardless of whether the foreign recipient is already directly subject to the
GDPR? Or, is an international transfer only considered such if the recipient is
located outside of the European Economic Area and not already directly subject
to the GDPR (the so-called “jurisdictional” definition of international transfer)?
Zimmer explains the rationale for each position and ultimately argues in favor of
a jurisdictional definition of international transfers.
The European Data Protection Board of the European Commission (the EDPB)
and individual Member State supervisory authorities have repeatedly failed to
define international transfers since the passage of the GDPR. This repeated
failure to clarify the interplay between the territorial scope of the GDPR under
Article 3(2) and the transfer restrictions of the GDPR under Chapter V has left
U.S.-based DTC businesses uncertain of whether they are making international
transfers under the GDPR and whether they must subsequently implement
safeguards, such as SCCs, to protect those transfers.
Zimmer explains how the Schrems II decision exposed the EDPB’s failure and
exacerbated the already uncertain status of European personal data processing
Vanessa Zimmer is a Lecturer of Law at the University of Southern California Gould School
of Law, a Lecturer in Legal Studies at the College of Business of the California State
University, Long Beach, a practicing Attorney (Zimmer Legal, https://www.zimmer.legal/), a
mother of three, and a Game of Thrones enthusiast.
*
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by U.S.-based DTC companies. The EDPB has further complicated the status of
international transfers in its post-Schrems II guidance and its issuance of new
SCCs for international transfers.
Zimmer contends that it is vital for the sake of transatlantic trade and the
continued integrity of the EDPB that the EDPB clearly defines international
transfers and explains the applicability of transfer mechanisms to U.S.-based
DTC companies.
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INTRODUCTION
For the past 24 months since the July 2020 Schrems II judgment of the
European Court of Justice (CJEU), cross-border data transfers have been at
the tip of every privacy professional’s tongue. Overnight, the CJEU took an
already fuzzy view of international transfers under the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) even further out of focus. Since then, we field
questions from clients, discuss the topic amongst ourselves, attend webinars,
and, if we counsel U.S.-based Direct-to-Consumer, or “DTC,” companies on
privacy matters, we pull our hair in frustration. However, even as guidance
from the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) of the European
Commission brings some things back into focus, the question of what
constitutes an international transfer under the GDPR remains unanswered, to
the detriment of U.S.-based DTC companies.
Since Schrems II, the European Commission has focused its guidance
on the implementation of supplementary measures to complement the use of
Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) and it has issued new SCCs in June
2021. However, this focus has distracted from the more important question
of how DTC companies can lawfully continue to serve European customers
from the United States when the SCCs (supplemented or not) are
inappropriate for their use.
Somehow, in the age of the Internet where anyone can know anything
in the blink of an eye, there is still an astounding lack of clarity around how
the GDPR’s territorial scope rules and data transfer rules interact with each
other. As Christopher Kuner has pointed out, “[D]espite the obvious
relevance of these two sets of rules to each other, and the fact that they are
based on the same rationale, their interaction has received little attention in
academic literature, court judgments, or DPA guidance, and has been
shrouded in mystery.” 1
This enduring mystery causes hand-wringing and uncertainty and has
financial costs. According to Axios, “U.S. businesses that operate
internationally say they’ve lost ‘tens of millions’ of dollars thanks to the legal
logjam, according to Jules Polonetsky, CEO of the Future of Privacy Forum,
an industry-backed nonprofit. ‘European companies are being cautious and
not going ahead with transactions until there is clarity.’” 2
At issue is the question of whether Chapter V of the GDPR is intended
to restrict only transfers that would not otherwise be subject to the GDPR
1
Christopher Kuner, Territorial Scope and Data Transfer Rules in the GDPR: Realizing
the EU’s Ambition of Borderless Data Protection, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, Paper No.
20/2021 (April 2021) (Eng.), at 4, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3827
850.
2
Ashley Gold, Businesses fall into transatlantic privacy hole, AXIOS (May 12, 2021),
https://www.axios.com/businesses-fall-transatlantic-privacy-hole-5162814b-9684-469db0ba-bc0705ebb44b.html?mkt_tok=MTM4LUVaTS0wNDIAAAF9Bak0IfHkqb6niAeFt6
DIzPc-Xu81TXyYeMmdgqQtk1-yw9lDs3r5VidhvHVaNUUFN6swqC1JiX80_XmnXRY2
yqX6QCNtPPMhWFviyMkjf2dG.
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(the “jurisdictional” view) or to restrict all physical movement of personal
data outside of the European Economic Area (the “geographic” view). Under
the jurisdictional view, U.S. DTC companies would need no safeguard, such
as SCCs, to accept personal data from the European Economic Area (EEA).
However, under the geographic view, they would need a safeguard, despite
the current unavailability of any suitable safeguards.
In Part I of this paper, I provide an overview of the U.S. DTC market as
context for the importance of the notion of international transfers under the
GDPR. In Part II, I describe the history of restricted international transfers
and explain that prior to the GDPR, the more limited territorial scope of
European privacy law resulted in a broad, geographic notion of international
transfers.
In Part III, I explain that the expanded territorial scope of the GDPR
brought the very notion of international transfers into question. Did a
geographic notion apply where processing by U.S.-based DTC companies
that was an international transfer under the Directive remained so under the
GDPR? Or did a jurisdictional notion apply where this processing was no
longer an international transfer because it was a behavior that brought the
company under the scope of Article 3(2)? I also explore the continued use of
safeguards, including the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, by U.S. DTC companies
even after the GDPR’s effect as a failsafe for compliance with the transfer
restrictions of Chapter V of the GDPR if a geographic notion was intended.
In Part IV, I introduce the complexities of the Schrems II decision by
the European Court of Justice. The Court’s invalidation of the Privacy Shield
framework as a safeguard further forced the question of how international
transfers should be interpreted. Although the Court’s decision implied a
geographic view, this view would make it impossible for U.S.-based DTC
companies to legally transfer data from the EU, as there are no suitable
safeguards under Article 46 of the GDPR.
In Part V of this paper, I describe how, through a combination of
contradictory regulation, caselaw, formal guidance, informal commentary,
and silence, the Europeans have boxed themselves into a corner where
neither the geographic definition nor jurisdictional definition of international
transfer makes complete sense. As a result, U.S.-based DTC companies have
little idea of whether their processing of EU data is viewed as an international
transfer and whether they need to implement safeguards and supplementary
measures to legalize the transfer.
In Part VI, I propose that the EDPB confronts past confusion head-on
by issuing clear and practical guidance for U.S.-based DTC companies that
serve European customers. I advocate for a jurisdictional definition of
international transfers as the most logical way forward. The EDPB must go
back to the basics of GDPR compliance and root its guidance in the
unquestionable fact that the core principles relating to processing personal
data under the GDPR apply to the collection of EU personal data by U.S.based DTC companies regardless of whether Chapter V so applies.
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I.

THE U.S.-BASED DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER MARKET
The modern U.S. Direct-to-Consumer market is ubiquitous. Even those
of us without Instagram accounts know a DTC ad when we see it—washed
color-branding, inoffensive typeface, and the bold proclamation of offering
you the last Chelsea boots, terry joggers, or cast-iron frying pan you will ever
need. With technology moving at an ever-quickening pace, it is easy to
overlook that DTC companies are a relatively new phenomenon. Prior to
about 2010, 3 manufacturer-brands generally did not sell their products
directly to consumers; rather they sold their products to intermediary
distributors or wholesalers who in turn sold the products to retail consumers. 4
As a result, historically manufacturer-brands did not collect much, if any,
consumer personal data. 5
In fact, no one was collecting much, if any, consumer data prior to the
DTC revolution. Short of addressing limited product safety recall concerns, 6
“Ever since the godfather of the DTCs, Warby Parker, emerged on the startup scene in
2010, venture firms have funded hundreds of startups trying to mimic that model.” Maya
Kosoff, Why all the Warby Parker Clones are now Imploding, MARKER (Mar. 9, 2020),
https://marker.medium.com/why-all-the-warby-parker-clones-are-now-imploding44bfcc70a00c.
4
“Merchant wholesalers had dominated American distribution for much of the 19th
century, buying from manufacturers and selling to retailers on their own terms, sometimes
under their own unadvertised labels.” George S. Low & Ronald A. Fullerton, Brands, Brand
Management, and the Brand Manager System: A Critical-Historical Evaluation, 31 J. OF
MARKETING RES. 173, 176 (May 1994), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3152192.pdf?ab_
segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default%3A0bf9256df6ab
81d19f7ffe2264062a58.
5
By the 2000s, some manufacturer-brands like Proctor & Gamble had implemented
nascent customer loyalty programs. However, many questions remained about the purpose of
these programs and how they affected relationships between consumers, retailers, and
manufacturer-brands. “With the technological advances we are seeing in industry, some new
questions also arise: what role will/should manufacturers and retailers play in each other’s
loyalty programs? What is the impact of loyalty in one channel (say offline) on loyalty in an
online channel? How will improved measurement of loyalty and its transparency affect the
interaction between manufacturers and retailers? Large scale customer relationship programs
(e.g., HomeMadeSimple.com by Proctor & Gamble) that provide data on tens of millions of
customers to CPG manufacturers may also alter the relative push-pull power structure between
manufacturers and competing retailers.” Kusum L. Ailawadi, Eric T. Bradlow, Michaela
Draganska, Vincent Nijs, Robert P. Rooderkerk, K. Sudhir, Kenneth C. Wilbur & Jie Zhang,
Empirical Models of Manufacturer-Retailer Interaction: A Review and Agenda for Future
Research, 21 MARKETING LETTERS 273, 281 (Sept. 2010), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/
40959646.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default%
3Ae81d65a9cadd33241d31de704f378715.
6
See U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMM’N, RECALL HANDBOOK 19 (Mar. 2012),
https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/pdfs/blk_pdf_8002.pdf (“[D]irect notice to consumers
known to have the product – identified through registration cards, sales records, catalog orders,
retailer loyalty cards, or other means” as a suggested method of identifying purchasers of a
recalled product.”).
3
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retailers were not obligated to keep detailed logs of each consumer
transaction. As such, retail outfitters focused on merchandising and bringing
consumers to their stores for access to products that would have been
otherwise unavailable. 7 The shopping mall was still king, and the brands
stocked within its stores were mere feudal subjects.
The early exception was the rising powerhouse Amazon.com, which
began to pivot from mere book-peddling to total world domination in August
of 1998. 8 Jeff Bezos’ personal life may be the stuff of tabloid fodder, 9 but his
business acumen cannot be denied. Bezos understood and harnessed the
power of consumer data while most retailers were still patting themselves on
the back for having a customer loyalty program. Although it would be eleven
years 10 before Amazon began manufacturing and selling its own house-brand
of goods, it was able to leverage those years of direct relationships with
Amazon customers to ensure its house brands would flourish.
Amazon had a data visionary bedfellow in Netflix. Founded in 1998,
the company initially sent physical DVDs to its customers who managed
their accounts through Netflix’s website. 11 Netflix began offering streaming
services in 2007, 12 and in 2012 inched even closer to a closed loop ecosystem
when it began producing its own streaming content. 13
However, aside from these two outliers, traditional brick-and-mortar
retail continued to rule the roost until approximately 2010, when the ocular

7
“[T]he mall offered access to a broader world than flyover country could easily access.
And unlike the Sears catalog, it did so directly and immediately, live and in person.” Ian
Bogost, When Malls Saved the Suburbs from Despair, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/when-malls-saved-cities-fromcapitalism/553610.
8
See Saul Hansell, Amazon.com is Expanding Beyond Books, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5,
1998),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/05/business/amazoncom-is-expanding-beyondbooks.html.
9
Jim Rutenberg and Karen Weise, Jeff Bezos Accuses National Inquirer of ‘Extortion
and Blackmail, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/technology
/jeff-bezos-sanchez-enquirer.html.
10 “Amazon introduced its first in-house brands—AmazonBasics and Pinzon, which both
sell everyday household goods—in 2009.” Kevin Lamb, All you Need to Know about
Amazon’s Privacy Label Brands, PATTERN (Jul. 2, 2021), https://pattern.com/blog/all-youneed-to-know-about-amazons-private-label-brands.
11 NETFLIX, https://about.netflix.com/en (last visited Aug. 19, 2021) (“1998 –
Netflix.com, the first DVD rental and sales site, is launched.”).
12 Id. (“2007 – Streaming is introduced, allowing members to instantly watch series and
films.”).
13 Id. (“2012 – Membership reaches 25 million members, and expands into the United
Kingdom, Ireland and the Nordic Countries. Netflix ventures into stand-up specials with ‘Bill
Burr: You People Are All the Same’. 2013 – ‘House of Cards,’ ‘Hemlock Grove,’ ‘Arrested
Development’ and ‘Orange Is the New Black’ usher in the first slate of original series
programming.”).
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disrupter Warby Parker burst onto the business scene. 14 It seems trite now,
but at the time, it was downright revolutionary for a brand to market and
distribute its physical products directly to customers over the Internet. In the
words of Warby Parker themselves, “[I]t was really about bypassing retailers,
bypassing the middle person that would mark up lenses 3 – 5x what they cost,
so we could just transfer all of that cost directly to consumers and save them
money.” 15
Warby Parker was almost immediately successful, 16 and thus, the
Internet gave birth to a legion of copycats seeking to disrupt the way we
sleep, 17 dress, 18 shave, 19 and even eat. 20 The DTC movement has been
described by Harvard Business Review as: “defined by borrowed supply
chains, web-only retail, direct distribution, social media marketing, and a
specific visual brand identity (the now ubiquitous “blanding”) that favored
sans-serif type, pastel color palettes, and scalable logos that were easily
adapted to a variety of digital media.” 21
Many of these companies also offer subscription services, which not
only provide a steady stream of repeat sales, but also provide a steady stream
of consumer personal data. 22 Whereas only a decade earlier, the average
clothing brand knew relatively little about the person wearing their wares,
the modern DTC clothing brand has a data lake from which to dredge the

14 Steve Denning, What’s Behind Warby Parker’s Success?, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2016/03/23/whats-behind-warby-parkerssuccess/?sh=43f690c8411a (“Warby Parker was founded in 2010, by four friends, Neil
Blumenthal, Dave Gilboa, Andy Hunt and Jeff Raider, who happened to be in business
school.”).
15 Id.
16 The company had obtained annual revenue of $35 million in 2013 and was valued at
$450 million. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Warby Parker could be next $1 billion company, CNN
(Mar. 5, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/03/05/technology/warby-parker-valuation.
17 CASPER, https://casper.com (last visited Aug. 19, 2021).
18 EVERLANE, https://www.everlane.com (last visited Aug. 19, 2021).
19 HARRY’S, https://www.harrys.com/en/us (last visited Aug. 19, 2021).
20 BLUE APRON, https://www.blueapron.com (last visited Aug. 19, 2021).
21 Leonard A. Schlesinger, Matt Higgins & Shaye Roseman, Reinventing the Direct-toConsumer Business Model, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/03/reinve
nting-the-direct-to-consumer-business-model#.
22 Tony Chen, Ken Fenyo, Sylvia Yang & Jessica Zhang, Thinking Inside the Subscription
Box: New Research on E-commerce Consumers, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/technology-media-and-telecommunications/ourinsights/thinking-inside-the-subscription-box-new-research-on-ecommerce-consumers
(“Subscriptions are an increasingly common way to buy products and services online.
Although streaming-media subscriptions have been popular for some time—46 percent of
consumers in our survey subscribed to an online streaming-media service, such as Netflix—
shoppers are now also turning to subscriptions for consumer goods. Our research indicates
that 15 percent of online shoppers have subscribed to an e-commerce service over the past
year.”).
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most specific or general data about its consumers. 23 Those that were early to
the party also had the benefit of “advertising arbitrage that could be exploited
on underpriced social media platforms.” 24
It is debatable whether DTC has taken retail’s crown, but irrefutable that
DTC is at least a Great House, 25 with a total estimated revenue of almost 18
billion U.S. dollars in 2020. 26 There are roughly 400 DTC brands. 27 In 2021,
e-commerce is expected to account for 6.6% of all consumer-packaged goods
(CPG) sales, and the DTC movement accounts for 40% of the sales growth
in the CPG sector. 28
The DTC revolution means that a brand looking to jump across the pond
into international consumer waters no longer needs to have a physical
location in the European Union, nor do they need to find a European
distribution partner. Rather, they merely need to start to accept orders from
EU shipping addresses. In short, collecting EU consumer data and processing
it back home in the United States has never been easier for U.S.-based
companies.
II.

PRE-GDPR RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS
Just as easily as a DTC company can be founded and funded, so too can
it be grabbed by the long arm of European privacy law. Years before the
GDPR (formally known as Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European
Parliament) became the belle of the privacy ball, U.S.-based companies with
European customers had to consider the European Union’s restrictions on the
international transfer of personal data. This is because although non-EU
companies were not directly subject to the GDPR’s predecessor, the
European Commission Directive 95/46/EC (the Directive), 29 they were
23 Elise Dopson, DTC-First: Why More Brands are Using the Direct-to-Consumer Model,
SHOPIFY PLUS (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.shopify.com/enterprise/direct-to-consumer (“Take
Molson Coors, for example. After pivoting its business to sell DTC online, it made some
optimizations based on data it had collected. That included: Catering to consumers’ requests
for a wider range of products. Optimizing its site visuals for mobile, since mobile traffic
accounted for half of all store visits. Running A/B tests on landing pages and creative
messaging to see which its consumers responded to best.”).
24 Schlesinger, supra note 21.
25 A WIKI OF ICE AND FIRE, https://awoiaf.westeros.org/index.php/List_of_Houses (last
visited Aug. 19, 2021).
26 STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109833/usa-DTC-ecommerce-sales/
#:~:text=In%202019%2C%20direct%2Dto%2D,Club%2C%20and%20mattress%20compan
y%20Casper (last visited Aug. 19, 2021).
27 Kosoff, supra note 3.
28 Dopson, supra note 23.
29 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L. 281) art. 4 (emphasis added). National law applicable:
“1. Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant to this Directive
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prohibited from receiving personal data from companies that were so subject
unless certain safeguards were in place. 30 The territorial jurisdiction of the
Directive staved off any pedantic debates about jurisdictional or geographic
definitions of international transfers because each definition would result in
the same consequence—that an international transfer was taking place and
should be restricted unless protective measures were guaranteed.
In contrast, the free flow of personal data among European Member
States have almost never been in doubt as “this principle is inferred from the
four fundamental freedoms of movement which define the EU, i.e., free
movement of persons, goods, services, and capital introduced by the 1957
Rome Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.” 31
In laymen’s terms, the Europeans 32 trusted each other to honor their
mutually understood and singular commitment to privacy as those in
Westeros trust each other to honor their mutually understood and singular
commitment to guest rights (that is, until Walder Frey came along). 33
Unsurprisingly, this trust did not extend to so-called “third countries” that are
based outside of the European Economic Area, unless the third country had
been deemed “adequate” in the eyes of the European Commission. An
adequacy determination required that the laws of the third country “prove, in
practice, effective in order to ensure protection essentially equivalent to that
guaranteed within the European Union.” 34 On the basis of these criteria, the
European Commission granted adequacy status to Argentina, Canada, Israel,
Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Uruguay under the Directive. 35
Unfortunately, no such status was granted to the United States, perhaps
due to the continents’ “two different cultures of privacy, which are home to
different intuitive sensibilities, and which have produced two significantly

to the processing of personal data where: (a) the processing is carried out in the context of the
activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State; when the
same controller is established on the territory of several Member States, he must take the
necessary measures to ensure that each of these establishments complies with the obligations
laid down by the national law applicable; (b) the controller is not established on the Member
State’s territory, but in a place where its national law applies by virtue of international public
law; (c) the controller is not established on Community territory and, for purposes of
processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on the
territory of the said Member State, unless such equipment is used only for purposes of transit
through the territory of the Community.”
30 Id. art. 25.
31 Mariusz Krzysztofek, GDPR: PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
247 (Andrea Biondi ed., 2021).
32 “Id. “Europeans” includes both European Union Member States and Iceland,
Liechtenstein, and Norway, which are members of the European Economic Area.
33 Game of Thrones: The Red Wedding (HBO television broadcast Jun. 2, 2013).
34 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, EU:C:2015:650, ¶74 (Oct. 6, 2015)
[hereinafter Schrems].
35 KRZYSZTOFEK, supra note 31, at 252.
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different laws of privacy.” 36 Thus, since 1995, U.S.-based companies who
wanted to receive personal data from the EEA had to take certain steps to
legalize the transfers pursuant to Article 25 of the Directive, even if they
themselves were not directly subject to the Directive. 37
One step they commonly took was to implement SCCs between the
European-based data exporting entity and the U.S.-based data importing
entity. But while this method was quick and easy for many situations, it was
not so for DTC companies as they do not have a separate legal entity based
in the EU to act as a data exporter.
A second, more appropriate option for U.S.-based DTC companies was
to self-certify to the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor framework. The Safe Harbor
agreement was reached by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the
European Commission in July 2000 (over the objections of the EU
Parliament) as a method of ensuring the protection of personal data
transferred from the EEA to U.S.-based companies. 38 Per Daniel Solove and
Paul Schwartz:
The Safe Harbor represented a bold policy innovation: it transplanted
EU data protection concepts into U.S. law in a fashion beyond the
willingness of Congress or the ability of the FTC and other regulatory
agencies. Its Principles were intended to be close enough to those of
EU data protection so that the U.S. companies in following them
would provide ‘adequate’ data protection. 39

By the time of its demise in 2015, over 5,000 companies had certified. 40
Although the Safe Harbor framework provided U.S.-based companies
with a relatively easy way to satisfy their limited obligations toward receiving
personal data from Europe, or perhaps in part because it did this, a storm was
brewing among European Union Member States.
Unlike its successor legislation, the GDPR, the Directive required EU
Member States to achieve the results stipulated by Article 288 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union by adopting their own, country-

36 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1160 (2004). Interestingly, Whitman argues that a unique divergence between
European and American privacy law is that Americans are wearier of government intrusions
into their lives (“Most especially, state action will raise American hackles much more often
than European ones.”). I am not certain that this logic holds in light of Schrems & Schrems II,
which focus almost entirely on the idea of excessive American government surveillance as
being anathema to Europeans’.
37 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 29, art. 25.
38 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1266 (Rachel
E. Barkow et al. eds., 7th ed. 2021).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1266-67.
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specific implementing regulations. 41 In addition, the Directive functioned as
a floor for regulation, and countries were free to reach for the ceiling by going
beyond the minimum requirements of the Directive. 42 This resulted in a
patchwork of “discrepancies between the regulations in each country,” 43
including those relating to international data transfers. For example, Austria,
Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and
Spain each required consultation with (and in some cases approval by) the
relevant data protection authority before the SCCs could be used as a transfer
mechanism. 44 In the remaining Member States, no such formality was
required, and implementation of SCCs was an internal corporate matter.
This lack of harmony ultimately undermined the Directive and gave
way to the GDPR, which as a regulation needs no further action by Member
States to be of full force and effect. 45 Regardless, the Directive was still in
place when the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ended the
41 “Directive 95/46/EC obliged the Member States, pursuant to Article 288 of the TFEU
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), to achieve the results stipulated therein,
but it only defined the minimum required adjustment scope; any Member State could therefore
go beyond those minimum requirements in the respective areas while adopting its own
regulations, which led to discrepancies between the regulations in each country.”
KRZYSZTOFEK, supra note 31, at 5.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 “Despite pre-approval from the Commission, as a practical matter, some data protection
authorities still require approval of the contractual clauses before transfer is permitted.”
HARVEY L. KAPLAN, MARK W. COWING, AND GABRIEL P. EGLI, A PRIMER FOR DATAPRINCIPLES
IN
THE
EUROPEAN
UNION
44
(May
2009),
PROTECTION
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&
ved=2ahUKEwiJ8rn3jtLxAhXSo54KHfm8BsAQFjAHegQIEhAD&url=https%3A%2F%2F
www.shb.com%2F-%2Fmedia%2Ffiles%2Fprofessionals%2Fc%2Fcowingmark%2F
aprimerfordataprotectionprinciples.pdf%3Fla%3Den&usg=AOvVaw37V3j-D1nrblxL
gerlLKYd. Pursuant to a protocol agreement between the Belgian Ministry of Justice and
Belgian Privacy Commission, “all contractual clauses used to transfer personal data outside
the EEA, to countries which do not offer an adequate level of protection, must now be
submitted to the Privacy Commission for prior approval.” Julie Hick, Vincent Wellens and
Jacqueline Van Essen, Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data: New
Approval Procedure in Belgium, MONDAQ (Jul. 17, 2013), https://www.mondaq.com/privacyprotection/251608/standard-contractual-clauses-for-the-transfer-of-personal-data-newapproval-procedure-in-belgium. “There are requirements for prior DPA approval of SCCs in
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Portugal (for transfers of non-sensitive data only), Romania, Slovenia, and Spain.”
LOKKE MOEREL, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE SCHREMS JUDGMENT ON THE DATA
TRANSFER GROUNDS AVAILABLE UNDER EU DATA PROTECTION LAW FOR DATA TRANSFERS TO
THE U.S., 10 n.32 (2016), https://www.itic.org/dotAsset/d/2/d2988618-d28e-4888-a192fd2cdc743a9a.pdf.
45 It is important to note that there will still be some deviations in Member States’ privacy
and data protection laws both (1) in local areas where EU law does not apply and (2) where
the GDPR itself permits such deviations, such as with regard to employment data under Article
88. KRZYSZTOFEK, supra note 31, at 6-8.
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Safe Harbor’s watch in its October 2015 judgement. 46
The Schrems I case was brought by an Austrian plaintiff named
Maximilian Schrems in response to Edward Snowden’s leak of “documents
that detailed widespread collaboration by American companies with the NSA
and called into doubt the ‘adequacy’ of the protection in the [United
States].” 47 Although the core privacy complaints of the case concern the
social media monolith Facebook, Mr. Schrems raised the case as a complaint
against the Irish Data Protection Commissioner “concerning the latter’s
refusal to investigate a complaint made by Mr. Schrems regarding the fact
that Facebook Ireland Ltd (‘Facebook Ireland’) transfers the personal data of
its users to the United States of America and keeps it on servers located in
that country.” 48 Because Schrems I predates the GDPR, the Court was forced
to consider Facebook’s U.S. processing of EU personal data in the context of
international transfers under the Directive. Thus, while Schrems I does not
give us direct guidance on the question of how to define international transfer
under current EU privacy law (the GDPR), it does presuppose that Facebook
Ireland’s sharing of Mr. Schrems’ personal data with Facebook in the United
States constituted an international transfer under the GDPR’s predecessor,
the Directive.
In the wake of Schrems I, the U.S. Department of Commerce and the
European Commission went back to the drawing table for a new solution.
The result was the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework, which was approved
only four months after Schrems I, in February 2016. 49 Yet only two months
after Privacy Shield’s debut, the European Parliament passed the GDPR
which would go into effect on May 25, 2018. 50 This timeline is important in
understanding the current confusion over the definition of international
transfer under the GDPR and whether U.S.-based DTC companies need to
implement safeguard transfer mechanisms.
III. THE EXPANDED REACH OF THE GDPR AND THE
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER HOT POTATO
The European Commission and the U.S. Department of Commerce
crafted Privacy Shield with the Directive in mind as a vehicle for U.S.-based
companies that were not otherwise subject to EU privacy law to receive EU
personal data from EU-based companies that were so subject. However, the
GDPR vastly expanded the territorial scope of EU privacy law beyond just
46 Schrems, supra note 34. Game of Thrones: And Now His Watch Has Ended (HBO
television broadcast Apr. 21, 2013).
47 SOLOVE AND SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 1267.
48 Schrems, supra note 34, at ¶ 2.
49 SOLOVE AND SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 1267.
50 European Data Protection Supervisor, The History of the European General Data
Protection Regulation, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/dataprotection/legislation/history-general-data-protection-regulation_en (last visited Jul. 1, 2022).
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those companies that were based within the European Union, bringing the
future utility of Privacy Shield into question.
A. The Extraterritorial Scope of the GDPR
The GDPR clearly applies to EU-based companies and EU-based
branches of foreign companies because they are “in the Union.” 51 However,
foreign companies need only jump from Article 3.1 to Article 3.2(a) to learn
that the GDPR also clearly applies to companies with no physical presence
in the EU if those companies offer goods or services to data subjects in the
Union. 52 In the words of the EDPB:
Article 3 of the GDPR defines the territorial scope of the Regulation
on the basis of two main criteria: the ‘establishment’ criterion of
physical location, as per Article 3(1), and the ‘targeting’ criterion of
‘market location’ as per Article 3(2). 53 Where one of these two criteria
is met, the relevant provisions of the GDPR will apply to relevant
processing of personal data by the controller or processor concerned. 54

Prior to the EDPB’s official guidance on the territorial scope of the
GDPR, which was issued in November 2019, there had been much debate
about what it meant to “offer goods or services” in the context of the
territorial application of the GDPR. 55 Was it enough to merely make one’s
website available to users in the EU, or does one also need to actively market
or otherwise target EU users? 56 Was the availability of content in the local

51 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2018 O.J. (L 119) art. 3.1.
52 Id. art. 3.1(a).
53 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 38 at 1247 (“This provision relies on the ‘principle
of market location,’ or, as the concept is expressed in German, the ‘Marktortprinzip’.”).
54 Wim Nauwelaerts, EU: EDPB guidelines on the territorial scope of the GDPR, ALSTON
& BIRD 4 (Jan. 2020), https://www.alston.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2020/01/euedpb-guidelines-on-the-territorial-scope-of-the.pdf.
55 Renzo Marchini, Does the EDPB answer frequently asked questions on territorial
scope?, FIELDFISHER (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.fieldfisher.com/en/services/privacysecurity-and-information/privacy-security-and-information-law-blog/does-the-edpb-answerfrequently-asked-questions-on-territorial-scope (“Article 3 is supposed to answer the
important questions of when GDPR applies (depending on the location of an entity processing
personal data, or of the individuals whose data is being processed). Unfortunately, Article 3
was drafted in a way that left many key concerns unanswered.”).
56 Kuner, supra note 1, at 10. (The former EC Article 29 Working Party had previously
noted that the transmission of personal data via cookies from an individual within the EU to a
server stored outside the EU was enough to bring the server within the ambit of the national
law of the EU Member State in which the individual resided.).
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language relevant? 57 These are important questions, particularly for
companies that offer the purchase of online services rather than physical
goods. However, for the latter, it is clear that routinely accepting orders and
shipping physical goods to the EU will qualify as offering those goods in the
Union, and those DTC companies will be subject to the GDPR under Article
3(2). 58
With regard to those DTC companies offering services, the EDPB’s
territorial guidelines include the fact that a “controller offers the delivery of
goods in EU Member States” 59 as merely one consideration for whether the
“targeting criterion” has been met. 60 However, just two paragraphs later, the
EDPB “recalls that when goods or services are inadvertently or incidentally
provided to a person on the territory of the Union, the related processing of
personal data would not fall within the territorial scope of the GDPR.” 61
Thus, it seems undisputed that anything other than an accidental fulfilment
of an order from the EU would bring a DTC company within the territorial
jurisdiction of the GDPR. Accordingly, regularly accepting consumer
account registrations from the EU would subject it to the same.
The extraterritorial jurisdiction of the GDPR, in contrast to the more
limited territorial jurisdiction of the Directive, means that, on the effective
date of the GDPR, many Privacy-Shield certified companies would pivot
from being mere recipients of transferred EU personal data to being directly
subject to EU privacy law in their own right. This overnight pivot placed
U.S.-based DTC companies and the privacy lawyers who counsel them in the
unenviable position of having to become armchair experts 62 on the GDPR in
a relatively short period of time. 63
57 “To establish whether a controller has such intention, the EDPB suggests assessing a
combination of various factors, including reference to an EU address or phone number on an
offering document and the use of a language or currency of one or more EU Member States.”
Nauwelaerts, supra note 54. The November 2019 EDPB guidelines include language as an
indicator of “targeting” to be “taken into account in any in concreto analysis in order to
determine whether the combination of factors relating to the data controller’s commercial
activities can together be considered as an offer of goods or services directed at data subjects
in the Union.” European Commission European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 3/2018 on
the Territorial Scope of the GDPR (Article 3), Version 2.1, 22 (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_3_2018_territorial_scop
e_after_public_consultation_en_1.pdf [hereinafter EDPB Territorial Scope Guidelines].
58 Id. at 18.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 17.
61 Id. at 18.
62 Armchair Expert, https://armchairexpertpod.com. (Armchair Expert is a funny,
insightful, and downright delightful podcast hosted by Monica Padman and Dax Shephard.
They have hosted hundreds of episodes on topics ranging from systemic racial inequality to
UFOs, but to my knowledge have not yet devoted an hour to privacy and data protection.
Monica & Dax, call me.)
63 Over the past four years or so, I have often found myself wanting to say “[I am] not an
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B. Restricted Transfers Under the GDPR
The GDPR continues the Directive’s restrictive tradition by limiting
international transfers to “a third country or to an international organization”
to those that are conducted via the “conditions laid down” in Chapter V. 64
The first such condition is through an adequacy determination that was made
prior to or after the effective date of the GDPR. The EDPB issued its first
adequacy determination under the GDPR to Japan in 2019. 65 Two years later,
it issued a draft decision in favor of adequacy for South Korea. 66 Most
importantly, on June 28, 2021, the Commission issued a final (though
temporary) adequacy determination for a post-Brexit United Kingdom. 67
However, adequacy has remained elusive for the United States. 68
EU-certified attorney; I just play one on TV . . . er, I mean spend my days researching EU
privacy law for fun.”
64 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 51, art. 44.
65 KRZYSZTOFEK, supra note 31, at 252.
66 European Commission Press Release IP/21/2964, Data protection: European
Commission launches the process towards adoption of the adequacy decision for the Republic
of Korea (Jun. 16, 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2964.
Interestingly, the draft decision makes an exception for 3 categories of personal data relating
to religious missionaries, candidates for political office, and certain personal credit
information. These exceptions provide a window into the possibility (though admittedly not
probability) of what a future U.S. adequacy decision could resemble. Might it be possible for
the EDPB to regard the United States as adequate, subject to sectoral or FISA/Executive Order
exceptions?
67 European Commission Press Release IP/21/3183, Data protection: Commission adopts
adequacy decisions for the UK (Jun. 28, 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/
detail/en/ip_21_3183. This was despite the fact that less than a month earlier, the European
Court of Human Rights ruled that the U.K.’s spy agency, known as GCHQ, unlawfully
collected massive amounts of surveillance data on Europeans, in violation of their privacy
rights. Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15
(May 25, 2021), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22documentcollectionid2%22:%5B%
22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22%5D,%22itemid%22:%5B%22001210077%22%5D%7D. It is likely no coincidence that two days later, on June 18, 2021,
Elizabeth Denham, the U.K. Information Commissioner, issued a statement on the use of live
facial recognition technology in public places. The Commissioner expressed that she is
“deeply concerned about the potential for live facial recognition (LFR) technology to be used
inappropriately, excessively or even recklessly,” and acknowledges that “In the [U.S.], people
did not trust the technology. Some cities banned its use in certain contexts and some major
companies have paused facial recognition services until there are clearer rules.” Elizabeth
Denham, Blog: Information Commissioner’s Opinion addresses privacy concerns on the use
of live facial recognition technology in public places, INFO. COMMI’R’S OFF. (Jun. 18, 2021),
https://ico-newsroom.prgloo.com/news/blog-information-commissioners-opinion-addressesprivacy-concerns-on-the-use-of-live-facial-recognition-technology-in-publicplaces?mkt_tok=MTM4LUVaTS0wNDIAAAF9vwtjrOvYQqAZ0xxGiDsic-Jo9z3H1JF1irh2cD1o1SUmS9ywdjEmxACGxEanTU8IxF5oVC6iQGgF9Nt0JJc4FArDBw
Chdbv2rhJWWyIr971.
68 No country, not even my beloved United States of America, is perfect. However, I
believe the United States has a strong argument for adequacy, particularly in light of the

90

Winter is Here
42:75 (2021)

As with the Directive, the GDPR does not entirely prohibit transfers to
countries without an adequacy decision. Rather, the GDPR permits the
transfer if the organization “has provided appropriate safeguards and on the
condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for
data subjects are available.” 69 At this point, DTC companies may be
wondering, “[W]hat’s the big deal? Can’t we just put some language in our
privacy policy and be done with it?” Oh, my sweet summer children; 70 if
only.
Although the GDPR sets forth various safeguards for transfer, 71 notice
via privacy policy is not one of them. Thus, while including a sentence like
“By using this website, you consent to the transfer of your personal data from
your country of residence to the United States,” might make you feel good,
it is not an approved safeguard under the GDPR (or a valid consent, for that
matter). Rather, under Chapter V, transfers may occur pursuant to: (a) a
legally binding and enforceable instrument between public authorities or
bodies; 72 (b) binding corporate rules (BCRs); 73 (c) the Commission’s
SCCs; 74 (d) other standard data protection clauses adopted by an EU
supervisory authority and approved the by the European Commission; 75 (e)
an approved code of conduct; 76 or (f) an approved certification mechanism. 77
At first glance, this seems like a cornucopia of safeguards from which
U.S.-based DTC companies may choose. However, for reasons explained in
Part IV below, each of these options are currently 78 unavailable to U.S.-based
DTC companies in a post-Schrems world.
C. Defining “International Transfer” Under the GDPR Before Schrems II
The entirety of this paper up to this point assumes that an international
transfer is taking place, and thus, needs to be safeguarded against. However,
under the GDPR, it is far from clear that this is the case when a U.S.-based
DTC company collects personal data from its EU customers.
Commission’s findings regarding Argentina, Canada, Israel, and Uruguay. Alas, no one has
asked my opinion on the matter (though to be honest, that has never stopped me from giving
it) and the United States remains woefully inadequate in the eyes of our European peers.
69 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 51, art. 46.1.
70 Game of Thrones: Lord Snow (HBO television broadcast May 1, 2011) (Old Nan: “Oh
my sweet summer child, what do you know about fear?”). Slang Lang,
https://www.slanglang.net/slang/sweet-summer-child/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2021) (“The
expression is used to describe someone who is naïve, inexperienced and untested by the harsh
reality of the world.”).
71 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 51, at ch. V, art. 60.
72 Id. art. 46(2)(a).
73 Id. 46(2)(b).
74 Id. art. 46(2)(c).
75 Id. art. 46(2)(d).
76 Id. art. 46(2)(e).
77 Id. art. 46(2)(f).
78 As of Aug. 20, 2021.
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Determining the confines of a “transfer” or “international transfer” has
always required wading in murky waters. In the 2003 Lindqvist case, the
CJEU noted that the Directive did “not define the expression transfer to a
third country in Article 25 or any other provision, including Article 2,” 79 and
argued if “Article 25 of Directive 95/46 were interpreted to mean that there
is transfer [of data] to a third country every time that personal data are loaded
onto an internet page, that transfer would necessarily be a transfer to all the
third countries where there are the technical means needed to access the
internet.” 80 However, since Lindqvist, the CJEU has repeatedly declined to
“opine on the conditions under which EU data protection law might (or might
not) apply in third countries,” demurring the pleas of referring national courts
and others to address the interplay between the territorial scope of EU data
protection law and data transfer restrictions in its Google Spain, Schrems,
and Schrems II judgments. 81
Thus, the result feared by the Lindqvist court in 2003 may have come to
pass. As Krysztofek explains, a transfer will now be deemed to occur by the
transmission of data:
within an IT system belonging to the data controller, between the
controller’s units (departments, branches, joint service centres), even
if the transfer does not involve any entities other than the controller
. . . . The rules for transferring data apply to all forms of transfer,
including sending personal data by e-mail, allowing someone access
to a customer database, exchange of data through a dedicated
application, communicating data in a telephone conversation or
handing them over in paper documents etc.” 82

Given this broad definition, perhaps we should be asking what is not an
international transfer, rather than what is an international transfer. The logical
place to look for an answer to either of these questions would be the text of
the GDPR itself. However, as Mariusz Krzysztofek points out, no legal
definition of “transfer of data” is provided for in the text of the GDPR, and
“the GDPR does not differentiate the requirements applicable to the transfer
of data according to the intended scope of their processing in the third country
after the transfer.” 83 This open-endedness means that “international
transfers” may include the obvious, such as when they are hosted on servers
physically located outside of the EU (even if access to the data is not provided
to persons located outside of the EU), as well as the less obvious, such as
mere access of data that is hosted within the EU by persons located outside
79 Case C-101/01, Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971
(Nov. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Lindqvist].
80 Id. ¶ 69.
81 Kuner, supra note 1, at 8.
82 KRZYSZTOFEK, supra note 31, at 248.
83 Id.
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of the EU. 84
Either way, the European Parliament’s failure to clearly define
international transfer within the GDPR, and the EDPB’s subsequent failure
to issue an opinion on the matter, as it may do under Article 64(2) of the
GDPR, left Privacy Shield adherents in a bind. 85 These U.S.-based
companies were left to speculate about whether the sharing of data that was
clearly an international transfer under the Directive remained an international
transfer under the GDPR and whether they should remain certified to the
Privacy Shield framework. After all, if a transfer was not occurring, why
would they avail themselves of a transfer safeguard mechanism?
The EDPB’s failure was noted by privacy watchers on the wall as soon
as the EDPB issued its draft guidelines on the territorial scope of the GDPR
in November 2018. At the time, DLA Piper noted, “the Guidelines do not
address other key interpretive questions arising from Art. 3 and Chapter V
(transfer restrictions).” 86 The Centre for Information Policy Leadership
(CIPL) similarly requested guidance in its official comments to the draft
guidelines. 87 It succinctly explained the critical consequences of the EDPB’s
continued failure to address the issue as follows:
For the proper functioning of the GDPR legal regime, it is essential
that this issue is considered and clarified by the EDPB and the EU
Commission in consultation with experts and stakeholders. It is not
clear whether this has been considered at all during the legislative
debates on the GDPR and there is no evidence that the text of the
GDPR contemplates what the interaction should be between Article 3
and Chapter V. Yet, as the jurisprudence and developments on data
transfers mechanisms take course, this point will become critical. 88

Interestingly, this much needed guidance on the interplay of Article 3.2
and Chapter V had purportedly appeared in an unpublished draft of the
guidelines that was circulated two years before they were finalized. 89 That
unpublished draft stated that Chapter V (the data transfer rules) should not
apply in cases where the GDPR applies directly under Article 3, because
“when the processing of personal data carried out by the data recipient
Id. at 248-49.
See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 51, art. 64(2).
86 DLA Piper, EU: New EDPB Guidelines on the Territorial Scope of the GDPR, PRIVACY
MATTERS
(Nov. 28, 2018),
https://blogs.dlapiper.com/privacymatters/eu-new-edpbguidelines-on-the-territorial-scope-of-the-gdpr.
87 Hunton Andrews Kurth, Comments by the Centre for Information Policy Leadership
on the European Data Protection Board’s “Draft Guidelines 3/2018 on the Territorial Scope
of the GDPR (Article 3)” Adopted on 16 November 2018, CTR. FOR INFO. POL’Y LEADERSHIP,
19 (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281/cipl
_comments_on_the_edpbs_territorial_scope_guidelines.pdf [hereinafter CIPL Comments].
88 Id. at 19.
89 Kuner, supra note 1, at 17.
84
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(controller or processor) in a third country is covered by the scope of the
GDPR in accordance with Article 3, there is no lack of protection and
Chapter V shall not apply to the passing of the data to the data recipient.” 90
That is, the EDPB embraced a jurisdictional definition of international
transfer in this unpublished draft.
Unfortunately, this crystal-clear guidance was missing from the EDPB’s
actual final guidelines on the territorial scope of the GDPR. In its place was
a mere holding statement that the EDPB “will also further assess the interplay
between the application of the territorial scope of the GDPR as per Article 3
and the provisions on international data transfers as per Chapter V.
Additional guidance may be issued in this regard, should this be necessary.” 91
Alas, no further assessment has been publicly undertaken by the EDPB,
despite global law firm Baker Hostetler’s succinct response that “[i]ndeed,
as noted by public commentary, it is necessary.” 92 Baker’s BigLaw
counterpart, Sidley Austin, also explained that “during the public
consultation many stakeholders raised questions about the interaction
between the provisions in the GDPR around territorial scope and Chapter V
of the GDPR.” 93 Finally, the law firm Alston & Bird noted:
A missing piece in the Guidelines is the interplay between the
application of the territorial scope of the GDPR, as per Article 3, and
the provisions on international transfers, as per Chapter V of the
GDPR. Further regulatory guidance on this interplay is considered
essential, as conventional data transfer mechanisms such as SCCs are
not always suitable. 94

The EDPB has provided no public reason for its failure to pick a side in
the ongoing jurisdictional versus geographic debate. However, a recent
comment by longtime Hamburg data protection enforcer Johannes Caspar
provides a hint: “[o]ne of the faults in the GDPR system, he points out, is the
way it gives regulators ‘lots of room for interpretation’ of the rules. ‘At the
end of the day, our energies are spent on infighting.’” 95
90

Id.
EDPB Territorial Scope Guidelines, supra note 57, at 22.
92 Andreas T. Kaltsounis, Reexamining the GDPR’s Territorial Scope, BAKERHOSTETLER
(Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/2020/reexamining-the-gdprs-territorialscope.
93 Sidley Austin, The Extra-Territorial Reach of EU Data Protection Law (Jul. 2019),
https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/publications/2019/07/the-extra-territorial-reach-of-eudata-protection-law.
94 Alston & Bird, supra note 54.
95 Stephanie Bodoni, Europe’s Data Law Is Broken, Departing Privacy Chief Warns,
BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-25/eu-sbroken-gdpr-needs-fixing-departing-privacy-chief-warns?mkt_tok=MTM4LUVaTS0w
NDIAAAF98ot6OBTo1xuOweoMmBkskQgPIPSsojPDXfgWPbG8Urm2MdGUgJiznyIy9Y
U5ICHKXO7xeW_Ih8VlgiSUdi8V4tB7rcib6FZC76BW1VThdrv0.
91
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But while the EDPB has remained publicly mum on the matter, some
individual Member States (or in the case of the United Kingdom, former
Member States) have spoken out. For example, the U.K. Information
Commissioner’s Office has stated that an international transfer to an
organization whose processing of the transferred data is also subject to the
GDPR (albeit the U.K. GDPR) is not a restricted transfer and requires no
additional safeguards. 96 Although the ICO has engaged in a consultation
process that invites input on this stance, 97 its current jurisdictional definition
is consistent with the EDPB’s unpublished draft from September 2018. 98
After the EDPB’s publication of its final Article 3 guidelines, the CIPL
continued to argue in favor of the jurisdictional definition, stating that in
these situations where “the personal data flows directly from the data subject
in the EU to the controller outside of the EU” the “non-EU organisation is
subject to all GDPR provisions by virtue of Article 3(2)” and thus, “should
not be subject to the provisions of Chapter V of the GDPR for the transfer of
personal data between the EU data subject and the non-EU controller.” 99 The
CIPL had earlier entreated the EDPB to consider that “having organisations
implement and accumulate different layers of compliance obligations may
ultimately run counter to operational compliance and accountability.” 100 The
CIPL supported a jurisdictional definition of international transfer by noting
both the reference to a “controller or processor” in Article 46; that is, without
a “controller or processor in the EU, there can be no transfer of personal data
under Chapter V.” 101
Kaltsounis, supra note 92; in fact, the ICO has gone even further, stating that a transfer
is not “restricted” if it is to someone “employed by you or by your company or organisation”
and that transfer restrictions “only apply if you are sending personal data outside your
company or organisation.” U.K. Information Commissioner’s Office, Are We Making a
Transfer of Personal Data Outside the UK?, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-todata-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/international-transfersafter-uk-exit (last visited Nov. 8, 2021).
97 In August 2021, the ICO issued a draft international data transfer agreement (IDTA)
and guidance to replace the old SCCs, which are still to be used for UK transfers (the new
SCCs do not apply to the United Kingdom, as it is no longer part of the European Union after
Brexit), as well as draft updates to its general guidance on international transfers under the
UK GDPR. Within its document called “Consultation paper and questions,” the ICO has
maintained its position that “in order for a restricted transfer to take place, there must be a
transfer from one legal entity to another.” (See Proposal 1, page 10 of Consultation paper and
questions.). However, with regard to transfers from one legal entity to another, the ICO has
proposed retracting its current guidance that a restricted transfer only takes place where the
importer’s processing of the data is not subject to the UK GDPR. INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., ICO
consults on how organisations can continue to protect people’s personal data when it’s
transferred outside of the UK, https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/ico-and-stakeholderconsultations/ico-consultation-on-data-transferred-outside-of-the-uk.
98 See Kuner, supra note 1, at 20.
99 CIPL Comments, supra note 87, at 20.
100 Id. at 19.
101 Id. at 20.
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Others have concurred, arguing that application of the data transfer rules
of Chapter V of the GDPR requires the exporting entity to be located in the
EU: “See Article 44 GDPR, which refers to compliance by ‘the controller
and processor,’ meaning that the presence of a controller or processor in the
EU carrying out the transfer seems to be a requirement for application of the
rules.” 102 Thus, it is feasible that without a controller or processor located in
the EU, there can be no transfer from the EU; there is only a direct collection
of data by the controller located outside of the EU. 103
Despite these very convincing arguments for the inapplicability of
transfer mechanisms to U.S.-based companies that were newly subject to
European privacy law under GDPR Article 3(2), the U.S. Department of
Commerce did not express an opinion one way or the other. The Department
addressed the passage of the GDPR and the expanded territorial jurisdiction
of EU privacy law under the GDPR. However, the U.S. architect of the
Privacy Shield framework did not offer an opinion on how the GDPR
affected U.S.-based companies who had certified to the Privacy Shield
framework prior to the GDPR’s effective date. 104 Rather, the careful wording
of its “important note” deflects the issue, suggesting that even the
Department may not know the European Commission’s intended definition
of international transfer. 105
Member State supervisory authorities have also remained largely silent,
perhaps in order to keep a broad, geographic definition of international
transfers in their enforcement back pocket, in case it becomes useful. 106 In
the absence of clear direction from either governmental body, it appears that
companies chose to stay within the status quo of the framework rather than
risk potential noncompliance with Chapter V in the event it was not
precluded by Article 3(2). I am unaware of any organizations withdrawing
from the Privacy Shield framework post-GDPR for this reason. To the
contrary, from July 2017 (roughly a year before the GDPR went into effect)
to July 2020, the framework saw a 125% increase in participants—from
2,400 to 5,400 companies. 107 U.S.-based DTC companies such as Amazon,
Kuner, supra note 1, at 23, n. 91.
CIPL Comments, supra note 87, at 20.
104 See U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Association, European
Union – Data Privacy and Protection, PRIVACY SHIELD, https://www.privacyshield.gov/artic
le?id=European-Union-Data-Privatization-and-Protection (last visited Aug. 20, 2021).
105 Id. (“The legal environment for data transfers to the United States continues to evolve.
Companies that transfer EU citizen data to the United States as part of a commercial
transaction should consult with an attorney, who specializes in EU data privacy law, to
determine what options may be available for a transaction”).
106 See Kuner, supra note 1, at 25. (“Data transfer rules also provide more enforcement
possibilities than an extraterritorial application of the GDPR, since many transfer rules can be
enforced against the data exporter in the EU”).
107 The Invalidation of the EU-US Privacy Shield and the Future of Transatlantic Data
Flows: Hearing before the U.S. S. Comm. On Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 116th Cong. 3
102
103
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Casper, Cuyana, Facebook, Glossier, Harry’s, and JustFab continued to
certify to the framework 108 until its demise on July 16, 2020. 109
IV. THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS AFTER
SCHREMS II
After digesting the news that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield framework
had been invalidated by the CJEU in their judgment widely referred to as
Schrems II, 110 I thought of the scene in Game of Thrones (GOT) where Sansa
and Jon share a knowing chuckle as snow gently falls around them:
Sansa:

“Winter is here.”

Jon:

“Well, Father always promised, didn’t he?” 111

As a GOT fan and Stark loyalist, “winter is coming” are my house
words. Ned Stark may have lost his head, but he knew what he was talking
about—you need to expect and prepare for the worst at all times. 112 As such,
privacy practitioners were generally unsurprised that the Privacy Shield
framework was short-lived since there had been rumblings of its impending
doom since its inception.
Nonetheless, the Court’s judgment was sweeping in its scope, going
beyond the CJEU Advocate General’s non-binding opinion that had
encouraged the CJEU to focus solely on the SCCs rather than the Privacy
Shield. 113 In one fell swoop, the CJEU declared European Commission
Decision 2016/1250 (the “Privacy Shield Decision”) invalid and the SCCs
suspect. 114 The Court acknowledged that although:
[t]he Commission found, in Article 1(1) of the Privacy Shield
Decision, that the United States ensures an adequate level of
protection for personal data transferred from the Union to
organisations in the United States under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield,
the latter being comprised, inter alia, under Article 1(2) of that
(Dec. 9, 2020) (Statement of James M. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Servs., Int’l Trade
Admin, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce), https://ogc.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/media/files/2
021/2020-12-09_eu-us_privacy_shield_james_sullivan_testmony.pdf [hereinafter Sullivan
Testimony].
108 U.S. DEP’T OF COM. INT’L TRADE ASS’N, Privacy Shield List, PRIVACY SHIELD,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/list (last visited Aug. 20, 2021).
109 See Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland Ltd, Maximillian Schrems,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (Jul. 16, 2020) [hereinafter Schrems II].
110 Id.
111 Game of Thrones: The Winds of Winter (HBO television broadcast June 26, 2016).
112 On reflection, I think Ned Stark would have been a better privacy and data protection
lawyer than he was Lord.
113 Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland Ltd, Maximillian Schrems, Opinion of
Advocate Gen. Saugmandsgaard ECLI:EU:C:2019:1145 (Dec. 19, 2019).
114 See Schrems II, supra note 109.
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decision, of the Principles issued by the US Department of Commerce
on 7 July 2016 as set out in Annex II to the decision and the official
representations and commitments contained in the documents listed
in Annexes I and III to VII to that decision. 115

In short, the CJEU determined that what was intended to be a narrow
exception to permit the limitation of the Privacy Shield principles “to the
extent necessary to meet national security, public interest, or law
enforcement requirements,” was in practice a broad loophole that
undermined the integrity of the entire framework. 116
A. International Transfers and Available Safeguards in Light of Schrems
II
Frustratingly, the Court did not expressly address the question of
whether the Privacy Shield framework even applied to Facebook Inc.’s postGDPR processing of Max Schrems’ personal data in the first place. That is,
although the Court described that “[s]ome or all of the personal data of
Facebook Ireland’s users who reside in the European Union is transferred to
servers belonging to Facebook Inc. that are located in the United States,
where it undergoes processing,” 117 it did not definitively state whether the
Court viewed this act of transfer and processing constituted an “international
transfer” by Facebook Ireland to Facebook Inc. under Article 44 of the
GDPR, a processing by Facebook Inc. in the context of the activities of the
establishment of Facebook Ireland in the Union under Article 3.1 of the
GDPR, or a direct collection by Facebook Inc. under Article 3.2 of the
GDPR.
Using the same logic as applied to Schrems I, one could assume that the
Court’s invalidation of the Privacy Shield as a transfer safeguard mechanism
presupposes that an international transfer was taking place under the GDPR,
as it was under the Directive. That is, the fact of Schrems II’s existence
suggests a geographic definition of international transfers. Under this
geographic definition, U.S.-based DTC companies receiving personal data
from the EU are forced to go back to square one of Chapter V of the GDPR,
under which international transfers to the U.S. may occur pursuant to one of
the following familiar safeguards: (a) a legally binding and enforceable
instrument between public authorities or bodies; 118 (b) binding corporate

Id. at ¶ 163.
U.S. DEP’T OF COMM. INT’L TRADE ASS’N, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework
Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, PRIVACY SHIELD, ¶ I.5(a)
https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=015t00000004qAg
(last
visited Aug. 20, 2021).
117 Schrems II, supra note 109, at ¶ 51.
118 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 51 at Art. 46.2(a).
115
116

98

Winter is Here
42:75 (2021)

rules; 119 (c) our old friend, the SCCs; 120 (d) other standard data protection
clauses adopted by an EU supervisory authority and approved by the
European Commission; 121 (e) an approved code of conduct; 122 or (f) an
approved certification mechanism. 123
Unfortunately for all U.S.-based organizations, options (a), (d), & (e)
are immediately off the table, as to date, there is no treaty or other “legally
binding and enforceable instrument” between the United States and the
European Union with regard to data transfers, nor has the European
Commission approved other standard data protection clauses or approved a
code of conduct. Of course, option (f) would be the dearly departed Privacy
Shield and Safe Harbor frameworks.
Option (b), BCRs are a viable path for multinational companies with
years to wait and legal fees to burn. But the process surrounding BCRs is
opaque, and there is no publicly available information regarding the average
cost and time to complete the process of application and approval. However,
it is telling that in the three years since the GDPR became effective, only
seven companies have been approved by the EDPB, 124 and under the
Directive, only 133 companies were ever approved for BCRs. 125 Among
these two hundred total companies, nary a U.S.-based DTC company can be
found.
That leaves U.S. DTC companies to consider option (c), the SCCs,
which may still be acceptable under Schrems II, but may require the
“adoption of supplementary measures by the controller in order to ensure
compliance with” the level of protection required under EU law. 126 In the
immediate wake of Schrems II, the SCCs that had been implemented under
the Directive (let’s call them the old SCCs) assumed that the company has
one entity located in the EU to act as the data exporter and another separate
entity located in an inadequate country, in this case, the United States, to act
as the data importer. These two entities can be affiliates of the same corporate
group or they can be two distinct businesses, but at the end of the day, it takes
two to tango and to contract.
This means that when Schrems II was decided, the old SCCs were not
appropriate for U.S.-based companies who: (1) act as a data controller, but
Id. at art. 46.2(b).
Id. at art. 46.2(c).
121 Id. at art. 46.2(d).
122 Id. at art. 46.2(e).
123 Id. at art. 46.2(f).
124 EUR. COMM. EUR. DATA PROTECTION BD., Approved Binding Corporate Rules under
the GDPR, https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/accountability-tools/bcr_en (last visited
Aug. 20, 2021).
125 EUR. COMM. EUR. DATA PROTECTION BD., List of companies for which the EU BCR
cooperation procedure is closed, https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/document.cfm?do
c_id=50116 (last visited Jul. 1, 2022).
126 Schrems II, supra note 109, at ¶ 133.
119
120
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(2) do not have an “establishment in the Union” to act as a data exporter, and
(3) do not have a third party co-controller in the Union to act as the data
exporter, but (4) who are subject to the GDPR pursuant to Article 3(2)
because they offer goods or services to data subjects in the Union. In short,
they were not appropriate for many U.S.-based DTC companies who had
been Privacy Shield-certified.
This is precisely why the Privacy Shield (and Safe Harbor before it)
were so valuable; they gave over five thousand small to midsize companies
a way to legally serve European customers without having to establish a
separate presence in the EEA. 127 Rather, under the GDPR, these companies
were merely required to designate a representative in the Union under Article
27 as a way “to compensate for the difficulty of legal enforcement of the
GDPR against non-EU data controllers and processors.” 128 One consequence
of the invalidation of the Privacy Shield is that these companies need to
establish an entity in the EEA for the mere purpose of having a data exporter
avail themselves of the SCCs. This is bizarre, to say the least because it goes
far beyond the actual language and apparent intent of the GDPR.
B. Derogations for Specific Situations in Light of Schrems II
Assuming that an international transfer is taking place, there is one last
possible mechanism for permitted transfers under the GDPR in light of
Schrems II—reliance on one of the very limited “derogations for specific
situations,” where the transfer is based on: (i) the consent of the data
subject; 129 (ii) the performance of a contract; 130 (iii) public interest, the vital
interest of an individual, or a public register; 131 or (iv) the establishment,
exercise or defense of legal claims. 132 In contrast to the safeguards of Article
46, reliance on a derogation is an admission that there is no safeguard but
that the transfer will be made nonetheless. This is obviously not a preferable
outcome, and as such, the derogations must be narrowly interpreted and
applied. 133
Per the EDPB, in their guidance on derogations that were released just
days after the effective date of the GDPR, any consent must be “specifically
given for the particular data transfer or set of transfers.” 134 Article 49 (1)(a)
127 SOLOVE AND SCHWARTZ, supra note 36 at 1267. (“Over 5,300 U.S. companies joined
this agreement before the CJEU invalidated it in its Schrems II decision on July 16, 2020.”)
128 Kuner, supra note 1, at 12.
129 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 51, art. 49.1(a).
130 Id. at art. 49.1(b) & (c).
131 Id. at art. 49.1(d), (f), & (g).
132 Id. at art. 49.1(e).
133 European Commission European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 2/2018 on
derogations of Article 49 under Regulation 2016/679 (May 25, 2018),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_2_2018_derogations_en
.pdf [hereinafter EDPB Derogations Guidelines].
134 Id at 7.
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also requires that the data exporter inform the data subject “of the possible
risks of such transfers for the data subject due to the absence of an adequacy
decision and appropriate safeguards.” 135 However, the EDPB notes that it “is
sometimes impossible to obtain the data subject’s prior consent for a future
transfer at the time of the collection of the data, e.g., if the occurrence and
specific circumstances of a transfer are not known at the time consent is
requested, then the impact on the data subject cannot be assessed.” 136 Lastly,
where there is any processing that is based on consent, it must be as easy to
withdraw as to give consent. 137 Thus, by the EDPB’s own admission, “the
GDPR sets a high threshold for the use [of] the derogation of consent. This
high threshold, combined with the fact that the consent provided by a data
subject can be withdrawn at any time, means that consent might prove not to
be a feasible long-term solution for transfers to third countries.” 138
We also know that the derogations for performance of a contract are
only applicable if the transfers are “not repetitive” and concern “only a
limited number of data subjects.” 139 The examples given are for one-time
transfers relating to a specific individual or set of individuals. This does not
reflect the situation of most Direct-to-Consumer e-commerce companies who
are making continuous transfers in order to serve EEA consumers en masse.
Furthermore, the transfers must also be “necessary” under this
derogation. 140 However, necessity will be interpreted very narrowly and
requires a “close and substantial connection” between the data transfer and
the purposes of the contract. 141 Business advantage or preference alone does
not seem to be sufficient: “This derogation cannot be used for example when
a corporate group has, for business purposes, centralized its payment and
human resources management functions for all its staff in a third country as
there is no direct and objective link between the performance of the
employment contract and such transfer.” 142 In light of the EDPB’s guidance,
it appears that almost nothing other than geographic necessity (e.g., travel to
another country) would constitute a necessity.
In short, the derogations are to be used as an exceptional surgical
instrument and not as an everyday tool.
C. Interim EDPB Guidance After Schrems II
Just one week after the CJEU’s decision, the EDPB issued its initial

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 51, art. 49(1)(a).
EDPB Derogations Guidelines, supra note 133, at 7.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 51, art. 7(3).
EDPB Derogations Guidelines, supra note 133, at 8.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.

101

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:75 (2021)

guidance on the Schrems II world of data transfers. 143 This guidance was
helpful for companies already using SCCs since the EDPB made “clear data
could continue to flow, including to the United States, so long as companies
adopted supplementary measures to ensure adequate protection.” 144
However, this was cold, inapplicable comfort for DTC companies that had
relied on Privacy Shield as their basis for the transfer, as the FAQs confirmed
the limited use of derogations. 145 The EDPB also declined to offer guidance
on whether it took a jurisdictional or geographic view of international
transfers and the Irish Data Protection Commissioner declined to respond to
related questions via chat during an online speaking engagement. 146
Four months later, in November of 2020, the EDPB issued a draft
recommendation on measures to supplement data transfer rules under the
GDPR and new draft SCCs. 147 This guidance again focused on the SCCs and
the inclusion of contractual, technical or organizational supplementary
measures if there are impediments (such as government surveillance) to the
effectiveness of the SCCs. If supplementary measures cannot be taken and
impediments remain, the transfers should be suspended. 148 This guidance
gave privacy practitioners ample material for speculation regarding how
European exporters should assess potential impediments when using the
SCCs. 149 It also gave European regulators ample material for beginning
143 EUR. COMM. EUR. DATA PROTECTION BD., Frequently Asked Questions on the judgment
of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-311/18 - Data Protection
Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems (Jul. 23, 2020),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/file1/20200724_edpb_faqoncjeuc31118.pdf.
144 Caitlin Fennessy, ‘Schrems II’ DPA investigations and enforcement: Lessons learned,
IAPP THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Jun. 17,2021), https://iapp.org/news/a/schrems-ii-dpainvestigations-and-enforcement-lessons-learned/?mkt_tok=MTM4LUVaTS0wNDIAAAF9
ugtYwxh1drLdKfWBVwITnqSHb-Z6iC5D_Z9fY_4B0PwzZCwuyq_RJy5Snb3TH5MX2
JQ8PXFTAw0BG0Fh8t56lzZsm-dvSv4Csgg_-q50qf60.
145 Id.
146 IAPP Linkedin Live Event, The CJEU Decision Unpacked: DPC v. Facebook Ireland,
Schrems (Jul. 17, 2021), https://www.linkedin.com/video/live/urn:li:ugcPost:668993671036
2558464/. Panelists, including Irish Data Protection Commissioner Helen Dixon, did not
respond to questions from virtual attendees regarding safeguards for U.S.-based companies
who cannot rely on SCCs.
147 EUR. COMM. EUR. DATA PROTECTION BD., Recommendations 01/2020 on measures that
supplement transfer tools to ensure compliance with the EU level of protection of personal
data (Nov. 10, 2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/consultation/edpb_recommenda
tions_202001_supplementarymeasurestransferstools_en.pdf [hereinafter EDPB Supplementary Measures Guidelines].
148 Id.
149 Gary Weingarden & Matthias Artzt, Demystifying data transfers to US data importers:
Looking at ‘Schrems II’ from a different angle, IAPP THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (May 25, 2021),
https://iapp.org/news/a/demystifying-data-transfers-to-us-data-importers-looking-atschrems-ii-from-a-differentangle/?mkt_tok=MTM4LUVaTS0wNDIAAAF9cc7U9q420PjvgxLWOGFTr13lKUHnXDV
wBgqGZUqroM4tMWcOAPFIBGvVm3_9--avfBecyYijUgmkNnzWngSLH0zrDDqy1xm4ZJOJ7F_Um9D.
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enforcement proceedings against companies that failed to assess potential
impediments when using the SCCs, though their approaches have been
inconsistent. 150
As Caitlin Fennessy of the International Association of Privacy
Professionals (IAPP) explains:
Supervisory authorities, with sometimes divergent interpretations of a
challenging CJEU decision, began to enforce its provisions. The
proactive and complaint-driven investigations related to public
statements and enforcement actions sent privacy professionals as well
as EU and U.S. diplomats scrambling yet again. EU supervisory
authorities’ actions and statements have raised a host of concerns
regarding organizations’ post-“Schrems II” response. These range
from simply suggesting there is an inherent need to investigate
companies’ data transfers, particularly to the United States, to finding
fault with companies’ failure to assess transfers, to adopt any
supplementary safeguards at times even when U.S. service providers
localize data processing in the EU. Each one of these actions adds to
companies’ uncertainty regarding compliance options, their wariness
concerning data transfers and their demands for a government-led
solution. 151

This uncertainty and wariness were compounded for U.S.-based DTC
companies, as the EDPB once again refused the call 152 to address the
interplay between Article 3.2 and Chapter V. Step one of the draft guidelines
may be to “know your transfers,” but it is hard, if not impossible, to be “fully
aware of your transfers” without having a clear definition of what constitutes
a transfer in the first place. 153 With this in mind, I would disagree with
Christopher Kuner’s assertion that “[t]here is little evidence about whether
the co-existence of territorial scope and data transfer rules actually presents
problems.” 154 I believe the lack of a valid transfer safeguard mechanism for
U.S.-based DTC companies is evidence in itself, particularly where these
companies cannot be certain if a restricted transfer is even occurring. For
150 See the action by the Bavarian data protection authority where it suspended a German
exporter’s use of U.S. based Mailchimp due to a failure by the controller to assess the transfers
being made to the U.S. via Mailchimp. BayLfD, LDA-1085.1-12159/20-IDV (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=BayLDA_-_LDA-1085.1-12159/20-IDV.
151 Fennessy, supra note 144.
152 Game of Thrones: The Winds of Winter, supra note 111. (Lyanna Mormont: “Your son
was butchered at the Red Wedding, Lord Manderly, but you refused the call. You swore
allegiance to House Stark, Lord Glover, but in their hour of greatest need, you refused the call.
And you, Lord Cerwyn, your father was skinned alive by Ramsay Bolton. Still, you refused
the call. But House Mormont remembers. The North remembers. We know no king but the
King in the North whose name is Stark. I don’t care if he’s a bastard. Ned Stark’s blood runs
through his veins. He’s my king from this day until his last day”).
153 EDPB Supplementary Measures Guidelines, supra note 147, at 8 (“The first step is to
ensure that you are fully aware of your transfers. Know your transfers”).
154 Kuner, supra note 1, at 21.
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these companies, the issue is not so much the conflict between territorial rules
and data transfer rules (because they should be treating the personal data in
accordance with the GDPR either way); the issue is the threat of a supervisory
authority alleging that they have transferred personal data without a legal
basis for which to do so.
D. Final EDPB Guidance and New SCCs
Unfortunately, the European Commission has continued to kick the
proverbial can down the road by failing to define international transfer, even
as it published new SCCs and a final implementing decision on June 4,
2021. 155 In contrast to the old SCCs, the new SCCs are designed for use by
data exporters subject to the GDPR under both Articles 3(1) and 3(2). 156
However, the implementing decision merely acknowledges the tension
between Article 3(2) and Chapter V. Nonetheless, it does not clarify whether
“international transfer” refers to a geographic transfer outside the European
Economic Area or to a legal transfer outside the jurisdiction of the GDPR. 157
In fact, the implementing decision only further confuses the EDPB’s position
on the matter and how U.S.-based DTC companies may use the new SCCs in
lieu of Privacy Shield.
The primary source of confusion is the first sentence of Recital Seven,
which reads as follows: “A controller or processor may use the standard
contractual clauses . . . for the transfer of personal data to a processor or
controller established in a third country, without prejudice to the
interpretation of the notion of international transfer in Regulation (EU)
155 European Commission Press Release IP/21/2857, European Commission adopts new
tools for safe exchanges of personal data (Jun. 4, 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/pre
sscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2847?mkt_tok=MTM4LUVaTS0wNDIAAAF9dvKSLGXYALNr
W9exH1JWC-mfoyq44LSftDUmzx2H59VIbpLWuDOg4XDTdQySYvvxCb5lW2NfTEF
mvHWGc9soXzPLu592-gOeOwxzXEcIOqsl.
156 See European Commission European Data Protection Board, Standard Contractual
Clauses (SCC) (June 4, 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/
international-dimension-data-protection/standard-contractual-clauses-scc_en (“On 4 June
2021, the Commission issued modernised standard contractual clauses under the GDPR for
data transfers from controllers or processors in the EU/EEA (or otherwise subject to the
GDPR) to controllers or processors established outside the EU/EEA (and not subject to the
GDPR).”). See also Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914 of 4 June 2021, on
standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries pursuant to
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, (O.J. (L 199/31)
13, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2021/914/oj?uri=CELEX:32021D0914&locale=en
[hereinafter SCC Implementing Decision] (“[w]here the data exporter is not established in an
EU Member State, but falls within the territorial scope of application of Regulation (EU)
2016/679 in accordance with its Article 3(2)”).
157 Joseph Duball, Getting Acclimated with Updated SCCs, IAPP THE PRIVACY ADVISOR
(June 16, 2021), https://iapp.org/news/a/getting-acclimated-with-updatedsccs/?mkt_tok=MTM4LUVaTS0wNDIAAAF9tMhWpcbyVME5B6wU1wtjAvnb0P4Al0FP
TpFv_kwE0fEsrf0n4TLwYH3gpw5oCapGbi8VP24xHUaFwPRoI_CS7xT9SFLnknUMcmsBi4lumH8.
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2016/679.” 158 The structure of the sentence alone suggests that the EDPB
reserves the right to define an international transfer in the jurisdictional as
opposed to geographic sense. To paraphrase, they seem to be saying, “your
use of the SCCs as a safeguard does not mean we concede that an
international transfer is actually taking place.” This is a strange thing to say,
as a safeguard would only be necessary if there was an international transfer
taking place. However, if the EDPB agreed on a geographic definition, they
would not need to reserve the right to take a later contrary view. Recital
Seven of the implementing decision continues:
The standard contractual clauses may be used for such transfers only
to the extent that the processing by the importer does not fall within
the scope of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. This also includes the transfer
of personal data by a controller or processor not established in the
Union, to the extent that the processing is subject to Regulation (EU)
2016/679 (pursuant to Article 3(2) thereof) because it relates to the
offering of goods or services to data subjects in the Union or the
monitoring of their behaviour as far as it takes place within the
Union. 159

In layman’s terms, Recital Seven precludes the use of SCCs where the
processing by the importer already falls within the scope of the GDPR. This
would exclude the use of SCCs for intracompany transfers where a foreign
legal entity is collecting EU personal data and storing it on its servers owned
and operated by that same legal entity in that foreign country (the U.S.-based
DTC company example). It would also exclude the use of SCCs for
intercompany transfers from a corporate group’s EU-based legal entity that
is subject to the GDPR under Article 3(1) to a foreign-based legal entity that
is also subject to the GDRP (the situation of Facebook in Schrems I & II).
However, it also may exclude the use of SCCs by a foreign-based exporter
that is subject to the GDPR under Article 3(2) and its foreign-based serviceprovider/importer that is also subject to the GDPR under Article 3(2).
Others have noted that the logic here appears to be that “the objective
of the SCCs is to ensure that exported data is processed to a standard that is
essentially equivalent with the GDPR, and if the data importer’s processing
is already subject to the GDPR then the SCCs are redundant in this
context.” 160 This logic, of course, leads us to a jurisdictional definition where
an international transfer is not even occurring in the above scenarios. This
would be supported by the CIPL’s argument that:
SCC Implementing Decision, supra note 156.
Id.
160 Phillip Lee, The Updated Standard Contractual Clauses – A New Hope?, IAPP THE
PRIVACY ADVISOR (June 7, 2021), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-updated-standard-contractualclauses-a-new-hope/?mkt_tok=MTM4LUVaTS0wNDIAAAF9ho57U4QkZATMc91Tszlzxn
7ziNEN8wiQAKnTyYci4YEHEvTA-SSeuuMbwnTmZEuJ3P3bs5gjBuZgTeg8J5OQfI1geTmeGyFnatOtbZRfrr2.
158
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an accumulation of the obligations under Article 3(2) of the GDPR
and Chapter V of the GDPR would not make sense. An organisation
acting within the scope of Article 3(2) must put in place all the
measures and safeguards of the GDPR. There is no added value in
requiring this organisation to additionally comply with the obligations
of Articles 46, 47, and 49 of the GDPR because the organisation is
already bound by all obligations stemming from these latter
provisions. 161

Unfortunately, the EDPB’s implementing decision is strictly limited to the
new SCCs and does not reference the applicability of other Article 46
safeguards to companies subject to the GDPR under Article 3(2).
Aside from Recital Seven, Recital Six supports a jurisdictional view of
international transfer. That Recital sets forth a variety of “significant
developments” in the digital economy that prompted the EDPB to modernize
the new SCCs. 162 This would have been the ideal place for the EDPB to
mention that the digital economy has also made it much easier for foreign ecommerce companies to directly collect personal data from EU consumers
rather than through an EU-based intermediary. In fact, a DTC scenario is a
much more likely scenario for international transfer than a scenario in which
a foreign e-commerce company establishes a complex and unnecessary chain
of processing in order to serve EU consumers. However, Recital Six does not
mention direct collection at all; perhaps its omission is an indication that
some members of the EDPB feel the DTC scenario is not an international
transfer at all?
V. U.S. DTC COMPANIES: STUCK BETWEEN A GEOGRAPHIC
WALL AND A JURISDICTIONAL MOUNTAIN
A. Can Anything Be “Right”?
In its press release announcing the new SCCs, the EDPB describes how
they offer “more legal predictability to European businesses . . . to ensure
compliance with requirements for safe data transfers.” 163 This predictability,
however, does not extend to non-EU businesses that are subject to the GDPR
under Article 3(2). Rather, they are still faced with the unanswered question
of whether their processing of EU data constitutes a transfer in the first place;
if a geographic definition is taken, it does constitute a transfer, but if a
jurisdictional definition is taken, it does not.
Thus far, I have made a case for a jurisdictional definition. Yet, as Ruth
CIPL Comments, supra note 87, at 19.
SCC Implementing Decision, supra note 156 (“[m]oreover, since the decisions were
adopted, the digital economy has seen significant developments, with the widespread use of
new and more complex processing operations often involving multiple data importers and
exporters, long and complex processing chains, and evolving business relationships”).
163 European Commission Press Release IP/21/2857, supra note 155.
161
162
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Boardman has eloquently pointed out, defining “international transfer” in this
jurisdictional way would have the “somewhat mind-blowing effect that the
“Schrems II” case invalidated (the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield) for processing
that was not even an international transfer. I don’t think that can be right.” 164
Her logic on this point is sound, and I am not inclined to disagree with her.
Ms. Boardman is a privacy rock star and far smarter than me. I would,
however, argue that the EDPB, CJEU, and individual Member State
supervisory authorities have complicated the issue of international transfers
to a point where almost nothing can be right.
For instance, taking a geographic rather than jurisdictional notion of
international transfer would mean that there is now a broad category of
international transfers that are acknowledged by European privacy regulators
but for which there is no appropriate safeguard or derogation. Are we to infer
that these transfers are now entirely prohibited? This does not seem right.
However, taking the jurisdictional notion would mean that no
safeguards or supplementary measures are required to collect personal data
by a U.S.-based DTC company that is directly subject to the GDPR under
Article 3(2). This is in contrast to a scenario where safeguards and
supplementary measures would be required if that same U.S.-based company
had formed a European legal entity to act as its data exporter and GDPR-heat
shield. Sensing the danger of this view, IAPP contributors have pointed out
that as a consequence of Recital Seven of the EDPB’s implementing decision
for the new SCCs, “[s]ome companies working outside the EU but still
subject to the GDPR via their EU establishment may see Recital 7 as a reason
to skip a transfer mechanism altogether, regardless of their third-country
status.” 165
Still, flipping back to a geographic notion forces us to compound
Chapter V on top of Article 3(2), turning Chapter V into a “regime of general
application, to all non-EU controllers and processors subject to Art 3.2.” 166
Could it be the Commission’s intent to embrace the result feared by the
Lindqvist Court in 2003? 167 After all, the European Data Protection
Supervisor, in its Case Law Digest has stated:
Duball, supra note 157.
Id.
166 Robert Madge, GDPR’s Global Scope: The Long Story, MEDIUM (May 12, 2018),
https://medium.com/mydata/does-the-gdpr-apply-in-the-us-c670702faf7f.
167 Lindqvist, supra note 79, ¶ 69 (“If Article 25 of Directive 95/46 were interpreted to
mean that there is ‘transfer [of data] to a third country every time that personal data are loaded
onto an internet page, that transfer would necessarily be a transfer to all the third countries
where there are the technical means needed to access the internet. The special regime provided
for by Chapter IV of the directive would thus necessarily become a regime of general
application, as regards operations on the internet. Thus, if the Commission found, pursuant to
Article 25(4) of the Directive 95/46, that even one third country did not ensure adequate
protection, the Member States would be obliged to prevent any personal data being placed on
the internet.”).
164
165
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These data flows (transfers and onward transfers) are subject to the
rules set out in Chapter V of the GDPR, as well as to all rules and
principles of the GDPR, notably the principles under Article 5
(lawfulness, fairness, and transparency, purpose limitation, data
minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity and
confidentiality, and accountability). 168

Christopher Kuner argues in favor of this, stating, “Since the GDPR does not
contain any provision regulating the interaction between territorial scope and
data transfer rules, either explicitly or implicitly, both sets of rules apply
when the conditions for their application are triggered, meaning that they
may apply simultaneously in some cases.” 169
However, one needs to consider whether a regime of general application
(and the geographic definition of international transfer that creates it) is an
impossible “legal fiction, since by their nature parts of the GDPR were not
designed to apply outside the EU” (for example, Articles 36 & 58)? 170
Furthermore, Article 3(2) only sweeps-in those companies that target goods
and services to EU consumers, while Chapter V applies to all personal data
collected from the EU; could it really be the EDPB’s intent to stretch the long
arm of European privacy law to Mr. Fantastic proportions by covering any
and all processing of EU data by non-EU controllers? 171 I am not the only
one begging for clarity on these questions. 172
B. The Consequence of “Wrong”
The current state of international transfers is perplexing for anyone who
dabbles in privacy, but particularly for those of us who consider ourselves
pragmatic privacy lawyers (no, that’s not an oxymoron). Clients need real
answers to overcome their real problems, not a thirty-page exploration of the
problem (these thirty pages are for my fellow privacy nerds). However, the
past year has pushed even the most practical practitioners to the brink of
esotericism.
Prior to the Schrems II decision, privacy lawyers may have been
tempted to dismiss this entire issue as an academic frivolity. One could
bypass the question of whether an international transfer was occurring and
simply self-certify under the Privacy Shield framework as a prophylactic
measure. Indeed, the sheer number of self-certifications indicates that many
companies did just that. However, in a Schrems II world, these companies
are left with a conundrum. Should they concede that they had always believed
168 EUR. DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, EDPS CASE LAW DIGEST: TRANSFERS OF
PERSONAL DATA TO THIRD COUNTRIES, 2 (Nov. 10, 2020), https://edps.europa.eu/system/files/

2021-06/21-06-09_case-law-digest_en.pdf.
169 Kuner, supra note 1, at 16.
170 Id. at 25.
171 Madge, supra note 166.
172 Lee, supra note 160.
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in a geographic notion where an international transfer was taking place under
the GDPR, and thus, a replacement safeguard would be required after the
invalidation of Privacy Shield? Or should they now boldly assert a
jurisdictional notion, where their Privacy Shield self-certification was a big
misunderstanding and no international transfer has ever taken place under the
GDPR? Neither of these answers puts DTC companies in a favorable
regulatory light. Furthermore, it is not clear which of these answers is the
“right” one in the eyes of the EDPB.
Of course, the most compliant path forward would be for U.S. DTC
companies to avoid collecting EU personal data in the first place. I will admit,
at times, I have wondered if that might be the EDPB’s desired effect. But,
short of an explicit declaration that they may not serve EU customers, most
U.S. DTC companies will continue to do so. Some U.S.-based companies
who act as processors rather than controllers, like Microsoft, have
transitioned to solutions that store and process EU cloud customer data
within the EU. 173 However, while a company with a large EU presence and
billion-dollar market cap such as Microsoft can afford to do this, the average
U.S. DTC company cannot. In addition, a DTC company acts as a data
controller rather than the processor, and thus, merely storing the data within
the EU will not prevent a transfer if it is also being accessed and processed
from the U.S.
The reality is that post-Schrems II, United States based DTC companies
are continuing to directly collect and process European personal data exactly
as they were before the invalidation of the Privacy Shield. While the
safeguards may have changed, the business operations have not. These
companies are aware that their collection may be in contravention of Chapter
V of the GDPR, but they have no choice, as ceasing to do business is really
no choice at all. Data transfer issues are big enough to cause public
companies to file Form 10-K disclosures with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission regarding risks over the legality of their transfers and
the impact of a regulator ceasing those transfers. 174
173 Brad Smith, Answering Europe’s Call: Storing and Processing EU Data in the EU,
MICROSOFT EU POL’Y BLOG (May 6, 2021), https://blogs.microsoft.com/eupolicy/2021/05/0
6/eu-data-boundary.
174 “As the two sides of the Atlantic alliance move out of sync, companies are paying a
price. Securities and Exchange Commission filings from dozens of different businesses filed
this year say the ongoing confusion over the legality of U.S.-EU data transfer may hurt
finances, operations and service offerings overseas.” Gold, supra note 2. “But now that
corporate anxiety is being reflected in earnings reports with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, according to a Morning Consult analysis of all SEC filings from publicly traded
companies in 2020. Companies outside of the tech sector—like shopping channel QVC and
ViacomCBS Inc.—have begun adding warnings to their investors about the possible revenue
hit the court decision and continued discussions about a replacement deal could have on their
businesses.” Sam Sabin, As Officials Hash Out Deal to Replace Privacy Shield, More
Companies — Beyond Tech — Warn Investors About the Risk, MORNING CONSULT (Apr. 20,
2021), https://morningconsult.com/2021/04/20/privacy-shield-compliance-sec-filings.
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Vera Jourová, the EDPB’s Vice-President for Values and Transparency,
has asserted that the new SCCs were a “needed solution in the interconnected
digital world where transferring data takes a click or two.” 175 She is correct,
but this is all the more reason that the EDPB should not continue to ignore
the international transfer question, as the question of what constitutes an
international transfer must be answered before we ask the question of how to
safeguard the transfer.
VI. FORTHCOMING EDPB GUIDANCE ON INTERNATIONAL
TRANSFERS: A DREAM OF SPRING? 176
It is rumored that the EDPB will finally answer both of these questions
in a forthcoming opinion entitled Territorial scope (Article 3) of the GDPR
and its interplay with Chapter V. 177 Unfortunately for the EDPB, what might
have been a simple, clear-cut opinion in 2018, before the invalidation of
Privacy Shield, will now almost certainly be a complex untangling of the
contradictions exposed in this paper. We’ve all been told by our mothers that
two wrongs can’t make a right, but the EDPB must now make two wrong
notions of international transfer into a right one. In order to do this, the EDPB
must reconcile the following in any opinion it issues:
The expanded territory of European privacy law under Article 3(2) of the
GDPR;
The continued restrictions on international transfers in Chapter V of the
GDPR;

•
•

European Commission Press Release IP/21/2857, supra note 155.
The HBO series Game of Thrones is based on the book series, A Song of Ice and Fire
by George R.R. Martin. Martin published the first five volumes between 1996 and 2011 which
contain various loose threads and cliff-hangers. Martin began work on the sixth installment,
to be called The Winds of Winter, in 2010. In 2006, he had announced the title of the seventh
and final installment, A Dream of Spring. However, it appears he has not yet begun to write
this novel and the HBO series began to surpass the book series in season five. As a result,
seasons six, seven, and eight of the show are just not that good (at least when compared to the
first five seasons). That said, I have empathy for the show’s writers and showrunners who
struggled to translate Martin’s notes and hints at what the last two books will contain, much
as I have empathy for the EDPB which has struggled to translate the CJEU’s and EU
Parliament’s notes and hints at how international transfer should be defined. Writing someone
else’s story for them is hard. GOT geeks like myself still hope that A Dream of Spring will
deliver the satisfying resolution that the TV series failed to deliver.
177 Ruth Boardman, Ariane Mole, & Gabriel Voisin, Replacement Standard Contractual
Clauses (SCCs): European Commission Publishes Final Text, BIRD & BIRD NEWS CENTRE
(June 2021), https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2021/uk/replacement-standardcontractual-clauses?mkt_tok=MTM4LUVaTS0wNDIAAAF9i47Vr8xiLFjmYhCKp5sPA3A
JDQvkruy335276NlsX8e7iLcpCar_NveRYeRojfk_4Flj4nxIRS86QawGfi4LERsHQGoYX
MuoPuK1WzyXJNum (“[t]he EDPB is currently considering the point and this is likely to be
addressed in an upcoming opinion entitled ‘Territorial scope (Article 3) of the GDPR and its
interplay with Chapter V’”).
175
176
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•
•
•
•

The continued use of Privacy Shield by companies who were clearly
making international transfers under the Directive but may not be doing
so under the GDPR;
The CJEU’s Schrems II opinion that suggests a geographic definition of
international transfers;
The United Kingdom’s ICO’s guidance (and unpublished draft EDPB
guidance) that suggests a jurisdictional definition of international
transfers; and
The EDPB’s own implementing decision for the new SCCs and the new
SCCs themselves which suggest a geographic definition at one turn and
a jurisdictional definition at the next.

This is no easy task, but then again, almost nothing related to global
privacy and data protection is “easy.” Indeed, difficult tasks are often those
most in need of doing. The members of the EDPB certainly have the intellect
to assess the above issues and draft an opinion that offers clear and practical
guidance. The question is whether the twenty-seven EU Member States will
be able to agree on the substance of what that guidance should be. It appears
they may be close to an agreement, as the first substantive item of the minutes
from their plenary meeting on September 14, 2021 is “[ITS ESG] Guidelines
on the interplay between Art. 3 and Chapter V – discussion.” 178 At four
sentences, the item description is brief, but revealing:
The lead rapporteur shared information about the state of play and the
progress of the discussions on the draft guidelines on the interplay
between Article 3 and Chapter V GDPR. During their discussion the
EDPB members highlighted the importance of this work and
exchanged their views on the notion of a transfer, the relevant criteria
to define this notion and examples to be included in the draft
guidelines. They underlined the importance to quickly finalise those
guidelines. The EU COM confirmed, that, after the draft guidelines
are adopted, they intend to develop a specific set of SCCs regarding
transfers to importers subject to Article 3(2) GDPR. 179

The first three sentences are both comforting and frustrating; they show
that the EDPB is aware of the urgency of resolving the notion of a transfer
while confirming that the EDPB members hold differing views on that
notion. However, the fourth and final sentence is the most telling. Upon an

178 European Commission European Data Protection Board, Minutes, 54th Plenary Meeting
(Sep. 14, 2021) 2, https://edpb.europa.eu/system/files/202110/20210914plenfinalminutes_54thplenary_public.pdf [hereinafter EDPB 54th Plenary
Meeting Minutes].
179 EDPB 54th Plenary Meeting Minutes, supra note 178.
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initial reading, I wondered, “could this be our Azor Ahai?” 180, as this
sentence seems to confirm a geographic notion of international transfer.
Although I believe a jurisdictional notion better aligns with the text and spirit
of the GDPR, at this point clarity either way would be welcome.
However, as Tyrion Lannister has noted, “[p]rophecy is like a halftrained mule . . . . It looks as though it might be useful but the moment you
trust in it, it kicks you in the head.” 181 Indeed, this fourth sentence only
partially addresses the conundrum of Recital Seven of the new SCC
implementing decision. As stated above in Section IV.D of this paper, that
recital precludes the use of the new SCCs in three EU-to-U.S. scenarios
where the processing by the importer already falls within the scope of the
GDPR: (1) U.S.-based DTC intracompany-type transfers (i.e., the U.S. legal
entity is directly processing EU personal data); (2) intercompany transfers
from a corporate group’s EU-to-U.S. legal entities; and (3) extra-company
transfers from a U.S.-based exporter that are subject to the GDPR under
Article 3(2) and their U.S.-based service-provider/importer that is also
subject to the GDPR under Article 3(2). The EDPB’s development of a
“specific set of SCCs regarding transfers to importers subject to Article 3(2)
GDPR” only addresses the second and third scenario. 182 With regard to the
first, it does not ultimately resolve the question of whether a transfer is
occurring for U.S.-based DTC companies because SCCs are unavailable to
them (remember, it takes two to both tango and to contract). In that sense,
our prince that was promised has not yet arrived and privacy practitioners are
left to write their own fanfic on the DTC question. 183
In my ideal world, the EDPB’s opinion would start with an introduction
180 Azor Ahai is a mythical legend in the GOT universe. He wielded a sword called
Lightbringer and saved Westeros from a dark ancient period known as the “Long Night.”
Melisandre and her cadre of prophets believe that Azor Ahai will be reborn in their lifetime as
“the prince that was promised” to save Westeros from the Night King and his army of the
dead. For seven seasons of the show, we were led to believe that multiple characters including
Jon Snow, Daenerys Targaryen, Arya Stark, and even Samwell Tarly may be Azor Ahai
reincarnated. For reasons unknown, the showrunners abandoned this prophecy entirely in the
final season. Although Arya Stark kills the Night King at Melisandre’s urging, we have no
indication of whether she, or anyone else, have fulfilled the prophecy of Azor Ahai.
181 GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A DANCE WITH DRAGONS loc. 74916 (Bantam Books 2011)
(ebook).
182 EDPB 54th Plenary Meeting Minutes, supra note 178.
183 Indeed, the IAPP has also noted the confusion caused by the plenary meeting minutes,
calling them a “change in course” for the European Commission. In addition, while my paper
focuses on U.S.-based DTC companies that are subject to the GDPR under Article 3(2), the
IAPP notes that it is also unclear how Recital Seven and the minutes of the EDPB meeting
apply to situations “when the GDPR applies directly to the data importer based on Article 3(1)
GDPR (where a non-EEA controller has establishments in the EU and the data is also
processed in the context of the EU establishment).” Lokke Moerel and Alex van der Wolk,
Why it is unlikely the announced supplemental SCCs will materialize, IAPP PRIVACY
PERSPECTIVES (Nov. 4, 2021), https://iapp.org/news/a/why-it-is-unlikely-the-announcedsupplemental-sccs-will-materialize.
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that recognizes the need for reconciliation of the above points. The EDPB
would then solidify a jurisdictional definition of international transfer and
clarify that the restrictions imposed by Chapter V of the GDPR are not
required for the direct collection of personal data by foreign-based companies
that are subject to the GDPR through Article 3(2).
The EDPB might even be so kind as to include an example of the same,
along the lines of, for example, where Company X is located solely in the
United States, with no establishment in the EU, but Company X accepts
orders directly from, and ships goods directly to, customers in the European
Union, such processing of EU customers’ personal data does not constitute a
restricted transfer under Chapter V of the GDPR and does not require any
safeguards such as Standard Contractual Clauses or Binding Corporate
Rules.
With regard to further processing of that EU customer personal data by
service-providers of Company X, the EDPB would ideally also confirm that
Chapter V does not apply where the service-provider is already subject to the
GDPR. For example, Company X uses the website hosting platform of
Service-Provider Y, a U.S.-based company that is also subject to the GDPR
through Article 3(2). In this case, the sharing of EU customers’ personal data
with Service-Provider Y does not constitute a restricted transfer under
Chapter V of the GDPR.
Lastly, the EDPB would be clear that although a jurisdictional definition
narrows the universe of international transfers and safeguards, it does not
result in a degradation of privacy for data subjects. Something like the
following would do the trick: The absence of an international transfer by
Company X does not relieve Company X (a) of its obligation to ensure the
security of processing under Article 32 of the GDPR at all stages of
collection, use, transfer, sharing, and disposal, or (b) of its obligations toward
the use of processors under Article 28; indeed, Company X may need to
implement supplemental measures in order to meet these obligations when
personal data is being processed outside of the European Union.
This last point is important because it addresses the core fear of the
Schrems II Court—that the security guaranteed to EU personal data by the
GDPR will be subverted by wanton government surveillance in third
countries. Some European supervisory authorities may be clinging to a
geographic definition for fear that a jurisdictional one leaves EU personal
data vulnerable to this surveillance. However, a jurisdictional definition of
international transfer does not preclude the EDPB from requiring foreignbased companies to consider the location in which they store and process
European personal data as part of their holistic GDPR compliance strategy,
including making security assessments under Article 32. In other words,
U.S.-based DTC companies, and other foreign-based companies subject to
the GDPR via Article 3(2), would still be responsible for assessing the impact
of how and where they collect, transfer, and store EU personal data.
These companies would still be required to evaluate the practices of the
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public authorities where personal data is stored in order to determine whether
the legislation and/or practices of the host country impinge—in practice—on
the effectiveness of the GDPR as a whole and not just on the effectiveness of
those transfer tools under Art. 46. 184 More specifically, the EDPB can still
offer guidance on the use of encryption and pseudonymization to protect EU
personal data from wanton government surveillance. In addition, the EDPB
can still require that foreign-based businesses provide EU individuals with
recourse for violations of the GDPR. A jurisdictional notion of international
transfer can be right, if the EDPB opinion is clear, rational, and practical.
Most important, by clarifying a jurisdictional view of international
transfers, the EDPB would be directing foreign organizations back to the
basics of privacy and data protection under the GDPR. U.S.-based DTC
companies have a myriad of obligations under the GDPR, separate and apart
from any obligations under Chapter V. Privacy-by-design, data subjects’
rights, data minimization, storage limitation, and security are all crucial for
protecting the personal data of EU consumers. Yet, the effects of Schrems II
have dominated the privacy conversation for the past year, perhaps at the
expense of other privacy compliance efforts. I would implore the EDPB to
consider that when an organization’s privacy lawyer devotes time to
exploring the uncertainties raised by this paper, that person is not spending
that time on core compliance activities like privacy impact assessments.
Furthermore, the current lack of clarity around international transfers
encourages U.S.-based DTC companies to take a bureaucratic approach to
intercompany data sharing and vendor management by “papering” those
interactions with ill-fitted SCCs as a prophylactic measure. In the vendor
context, long SCCs are often explained away as boilerplate or compliance
requirements, which serves no one. We know that controllers subject to the
GDPR under Article 3(2) are required to comply with the GDPR regardless
of where and how they process EU personal data. Thus, going round and
round in tautological circles of safeguards and supplementary measures are
a distraction from the fact that the Schrems II judgment “reminds us that the
protection granted to personal data in the European Economic Area (EEA)
must travel with the data wherever it goes.” 185 It is hard to see how transfer
safeguards under Article 46 of the GDPR ensure that protection better than
general compliance with Articles 28 and 32. The EDPB should take this
opportunity to refocus the post-Schrems II dialogue on core compliance
184 Press Release, European Data Protection Board, EDPB adopts final version of
Recommendations on supplementary measures, letter to EU Institutions on the privacy and
data protection aspects of a possible digital euro, and designates three EDPB Members to the
ETIAS
Fundamental
Rights
Guidance
Board
(June
21,
2021),
https://edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2021/edpb-adopts-final-version-recommendationssupplementary-measures-letter-eu_en?mkt_tok=MTM4LUVaTS0wNDIAAAF9zoGrYP_GaSBkmaYFAjHIUGMwAO8Zx8LbRl7SW-YcTuTcJBBcSpfGu-epm1Sh4NsmKPVzyoc
XBwPkM9whyTc5XuDDcyZjWDTn0AZ4-k_F-Sf.
185 EDPB Supplementary Measures Guidelines, supra note 147, at 2.
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activities by foreign-based companies subject to the GDPR under Article
3(2).
CONCLUSION
It is easy for academics and regulators to veer toward the obtuse.
However, in the case of international transfers under the GDPR, the practical
implications are clear. In his December 2020 testimony before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Services James Sullivan testified to the enormous
importance of transatlantic data flows to the $5.6 trillion annual value of
transatlantic trade. 186 Viewed through this lens, the EDPB risks
approximately $15 billion each day that it delays in issuing an opinion on the
interplay of Article 3(2) and Chapter VI of the GDPR. In addition to the
economic costs of their delay, they risk their own credibility when they refuse
to address such a fundamental issue.
In the words of Johannes Caspar, the Hamburg data protection
authority, “[a]uthorities have to work fast and effectively to be able to give
clearly deterring signs that certain behaviors are not OK. If that doesn’t
happen, law and reality are at odds.” 187 Unless and until the EDPB issues its
formal guidance on Article 3(2) and Chapter VI, law and reality will continue
to be at odds, and privacy lawyers must continue to dream of Spring.
POSTSCRIPT
Shortly before this paper’s publication, the EDPB issued draft
guidelines on the interplay between the territorial jurisdiction of the GDPR
(Article 3) and the GDPR’s provisions on international transfers (Chapter
V). 188 To say this is welcome news would be an understatement since my
paper entreats the EDPB to do this. 189 Even more welcome is the EDPB’s
preliminary position that it is not a transfer under Chapter V of the GDPR
when a U.S.-based DTC company collects personal data directly from its EU

Sullivan Testimony, supra note 107 (“[t]he United States and the European Union
enjoy a $7.1 trillion economic relationship—with $5.6 trillion in transatlantic trade annually.
According to some estimates, nearly $450 billion of this trade involves digital services. In
truth—given the ongoing digitization of virtually every industry sector and the fact that crossborder data flows between the U.S. and Europe are the highest in the world—far more of that
overall $5.6 trillion in trade is facilitated in some way by cross-border transfers of data.”).
187 Bodoni, supra note 95.
188 EUR. COMM. EUR. DATA PROTECTION BD., Guidelines 05/2021 on the Interplay between
the application of Article 3 and the provisions on international transfers as per Chapter V of
the GDPR, 5 (Nov. 18, 2021), https://edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2021-11/edpb_
guidelinesinterplaychapterv_article3_adopted_en.pdf.
189 I haven’t been this excited since we learned that Jon Snow is not Ned Stark’s biological
son. Game of Thrones: The Winds of Winter (HBO television broadcast June 26, 2016).
186
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customers. 190 The EDPB even kindly provides an example of this scenario
that almost exactly matches what I advocate for in Section VI of my paper. 191
I am cautiously optimistic that these positive developments will be
maintained in the EDPB’s final guidelines. However, it is possible that this
draft could substantially change in the months after the public consultation
period closes on January 31, 2022. Time will tell; in the meantime, I hope
you enjoyed my paper.

“This second criterion cannot be considered as fulfilled where the data are disclosed
directly and on his or her own initiative by the data subject to the recipient. In such case, there
is no controller or processor sending or making the data available (“exporter”).” Id.
191 See “Example 1: Controller in a third country collects data directly from a data subject
in the EU,” featuring an Italian consumer named Maria who purchases a dress from a
Singaporean e-commerce site. Id.
190
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